

The German Tribune

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Schmidt reminds Germans of obligation to Poles

The Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, has urged Germans not to forget that the country has a special obligation towards Poland. He made the reference in his New Year address.

For decades France felt Bonn was too subservient to America. Chancellor Schmidt is now accused of showing greater consideration for Moscow than for Washington.

In a cartoon of the Polish crisis *L'Express*, the French news weekly, portrayed Helmut Schmidt in a servile pose as Mr Brezhnev's bootblack.

French government circles hint that the German leader is pursuing such weak-kneed policies that France is forced to side closer with Washington.

In his New Year address Herr Schmidt ignored the allegations. They came from a country where orthodox pro-Moscow Communists are Cabinet Ministers.

This served only to strengthen his impression that it was merely a case of a German whipping boy being needed to provide an alibi for France's own passive attitude towards the Poland.

The Chancellor said, as he had told the Bundestag, that his heart was with the Polish workers. Hardly a clear declaration of commitment.

Members of Poland's Solidarity trade union are now forced to resort to clandestine operations, and Herr Schmidt is unlikely to follow them underground.

President Reagan has made it clear that Poles who might want to man the barricades cannot expect support from the United States.

It is a stand reminiscent of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, and an advocate of the rollback approach to Communism.

In 1953, after the East German uprising, he too made it clear that the US government had no intention of encouraging revolutionary movements behind the Iron Curtain.

This is a precautionary measure, and an understandably appropriate one.

Critical comments on the Chancellor's reluctance to nail his colours to the mast on material law in Poland tend to stress a special German obligation to Poland in view of the past.

The Chancellor stressed this aspect too in his reference to German aid to Poland.

Polish underground workers have taken to adding the German word *Bekanntmachung* to official announcements billposted by the military regime.

The word means "announcement" but the reference is clear; it invariably headed Nazi proclamations in occupied Europe.

Le Monde, the Paris daily, has even gone so far as to say that Bonn's policy of restraint towards Warsaw is a continuation of the suppression of Polish freedom agreed by Hitler and Stalin in 1939.

Lessons learnt from the past, if any, have tended to differ, but whereas the division of Poland in 1939 was undertaken in disgraceful German-Soviet complicity, Poland's post-war destiny has been decided without reference to Germans.

Germany was not represented at the 1945 Yalta conference, at which Roosevelt shortsightedly and Churchill pensively agreed to leave Poland dependent on Russia, a dependence to which Poland has been subject since World War II.

Among those responsible for General Jaruzelski's imposition of martial law in Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany comes virtually at the end of the list.

Yet the Chancellor remains insistent that Germany still has a special responsibility for peace, and he includes the GDR's Erich Honecker in this responsibility as though nothing had happened since he conferred with the East German leader.

World peace may indeed hold preference over Poland, but a Soviet invasion of Poland could deal it an irreparable blow, as the Chancellor warned Mr Brezhnev.

Shortly before Herr Schmidt met President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig said the Soviet Union was in the process of driving a wedge between Bonn and Washington.

The Chancellor was faced with the tough task of dispelling any such fears in Washington and dashing any such hopes in Moscow.

He had to convince the President that Bonn's cautious approach to Poland meant neither that Germany had switched sides and lined up with the East Bloc nor that Bonn was keen to capitalise on the US trade embargo.

He also had to make it clear that he had no intention of being cast as the scapegoat merely because others were at a loss what to do about Poland.

Otherwise misunderstanding might lead to a dangerous alienation shaking the foundations of the Atlantic alliance.

(General-Anzeiger, 2 January 1982)

IN THIS ISSUE



Polish visitor

Poland's deputy Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, talks with Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Bonn. The surprise visit was the first to a Western country by a senior member of the Polish government since the state of emergency was declared. (Photo: dpa)

(Cartoon: Hanel/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)

Chancellor gives a warning

Any change in the superpowers' spheres of influence could lead to war, says Chancellor Schmidt.

He was responding to a suggestion by President Mitterrand that there should be changes to the division of Europe worked out at Yalta in 1945.

Schmidt's retort was prompt. And he is right.

It is hard to imagine either America or Russia voluntarily relinquishing any of their bastions in Europe.

So there is an all-party consensus in Bonn that keeping the peace must be the foremost objective, holding priority over freedom for the East Bloc or German unity.

But does not Bonn's policy of accepting and maintaining the status quo run the risk of losing sight of Germany's interest in reunification?

Reunification is a term that is not viewed kindly in official parlance nowadays. This is a logical consequence of the policy of rapprochement with Moscow and East Berlin.

It is hard to recognise the GDR de facto and at the same time clamour for reunification. Besides, Bonn has an understandable interest in upholding and, whenever possible, adding to the results of its *Ostpolitik*.

That is why it is usually extremely cautious when a tougher attitude towards the East Bloc is called for, as with sanctions against Poland.

The Opposition has often accused Bonn of being soft on this point, and not without justification. It is not enough to point to some distant nebulous future.

Germans, like everyone else, have a right to live together in a single nation-state, and not just at some unspecified, far-off future date.

Falk Osberger

(Kieler Nachrichten, 4 January 1982)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

A year of getting nowhere at Madrid talks

The second Helsinki review conference in Madrid got nowhere last year.

When the delegates from the 35 nations represented went home at Christmas, the hardening of views by both East and West was apparent.

Despite the months of talks over improvements in individual contacts, trade ties, confidence-building measures, human rights and freedom of movement, no headway was made.

The conference was opened in November 1980 to review progress on the 1975 Helsinki accords and draft fresh proposals on security and cooperation in Europe.

It was agreed to adjourn until 9 February, but delegates were not optimistic that the recess would help.

It was not expected that a rapid agreement on a final document could be made without someone losing face. That is how deep the rift is that divides East and West.

It can have been scant consolation to know that the MBFR delegations in Vienna, who have been negotiating on mutual balanced force reduction in Central Europe for more than eight years, were in the same boat.

The Madrid conference adjourned at a moment when the much-vaunted spirit of Helsinki was persistently being breached in Poland.

In Gorki, Russia, it took Soviet Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov and his wife a hunger strike to gain for their daughter-in-law one of the points Mr Brezhnev too promised at Helsinki to promote: family reunification.

At such a point in time one wonders whether it is still worth even recalling the Helsinki accords.

And is it worth while allowing the second Helsinki review conference to drag on endlessly when the first conference, held in Belgrade four years ago, ended with a non-committal final document?

Ought politicians not to be honest enough to call it a day and admit that there is no detente at present?

These are questions asked not only by the public but also, time and again, by Western and neutral politicians.

They have decided to carry on even though no end is in sight and the East Bloc's tactics of attrition, blocking progress for months, have made their mark.

These tactics have not been without effect on Moscow itself, which was less than enthusiastic to resume the Madrid talks in February and would have preferred Western and neutral diplomats to throw in the towel and agree to a longer recess.

Moscow has long wanted a longer recess, so as not to be continually reminded in public of the unfulfilled promises of Helsinki.

It is largely due to the efforts of Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that the Madrid conference is still in being.

He announced months in advance that he was determined to attend the opening and final sessions at Madrid in person, and this resulted in many Western and neutral counterparts following suit.

The East Bloc countries were represented only by Deputy Foreign Ministers, but Herr Genscher and his colleagues demonstrated by their attendance the importance they still attach to the Helsinki process.

At the December round of Nato talks the German Foreign Minister prevailed with his view that the CSCE, or Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was the only East-West forum in which the West had clearly retained the initiative.

The Helsinki review conference, it followed, ought not carelessly to be abandoned.

This alone will not ensure the Madrid talks are a success, but it does have the necessary side-effect that the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies realise the West is not prepared to let them off the hook.

The East Bloc remains pledged to constructive negotiations, especially as the Soviet Union first thought of holding the Helsinki talks.

But Russia must long regret having done so. In the Soviet view the Helsinki process has got out of hand and been more trouble than it was worth ever since the Helsinki accords were signed, if not longer.

Too many people in the Soviet bloc have called on Mr Brezhnev, Herr Honecker and the Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Bulgarian and Rumanian leaders to honour their promises.

For the most part the East Bloc leaders have failed to do so; either that or they have persistently been in breach of the Helsinki accords.

There is still no prospect of agreement on the extension of manoeuvre notification to the whole of Europe, an issue on which the West's position is clear.

It is that this is an urgently needed confidence-building measure and a prerequisite for the success of an all-European disarmament conference as called for by the Soviet Union.

In return for its consent to this the East Bloc wants prior notification of manoeuvres to be extended to the Atlantic too.

So the Russians are only prepared to divulge details of troop movements in European Russia as far as the Urals provided they learn more about the military activities of the Americans well beyond Europe.

This is a concession the United States is naturally reluctant to make.

So the Europeans, midway between Russia and America, will have to resign themselves to Christmas and the New Year bringing no change; they can but hope for progress by Easter.

Events in Poland have been a serious setback to the Madrid conference, but they are also a reason why the talks should not be abandoned altogether.

We all know from experience that when the person at the other end of the line runs out of arguments he may hang up, resulting in contacts being interrupted for some time.

In Madrid both sides still have the telephone receivers glued to their ears, as it were, and everyone is anxious to ensure, despite differences of opinion, that the line is held.

That, naturally, is much too little.

Siegfried Löffler

(Der Tagesspiegel, 20 December 1981)



(Cartoon: Mussil/Frankfurter Rundschau)

It's not just my idea, says Brezhnev

Mr Brezhnev has put the record straight. No-one could say Soviet policy over the past few years had been solely of his making, he said.

It had been the result of collective decisions and bore the entire Soviet leadership's seal of approval.

In other words, the Soviet Union has committed itself to a political and economic course extending beyond Mr Brezhnev's tenure of office.

It is aimed at targets with an endurance and a tenacity that at times are underestimated in the West.

Mr Brezhnev made his comments to East Bloc leaders who assembled to congratulate him on his 75th birthday.

He thus acknowledged that Moscow is not loath to use existing factors on which it depends to gain leverage for Soviet policy.

Now the Polish junta has fulfilled Moscow's political demands the Soviet Union has a vested interest in improving the situation, especially the supply situation, in Poland, even if it has to do so at its own expense.

As for other deviationists, such as Rumania, Moscow has no compunction in reminding them that it still holds the whip hand when it comes to oil supplies.

The crisis in Poland diverts attention from crises elsewhere in the East Bloc, but everywhere a sober view seems to prevail. Ideological issues are only discussed when a deviationist puts in an appearance.

In the West the current aim is to maintain living standards at their high level; in Comecon countries people are still fighting a daily fight for the most basic of foods.

Supplies of basic commodities are a problem, and not only in Poland and the Soviet Union. In Rumania, for instance, bread is rationed.

Regulations are in force entitling people to shop only in the areas where they live.

After price increases in Czechoslovakia there were reports of hoarding and of items such as sugar and detergent powder being in short supply.

The price increases for energy and oil imposed by the Soviet Union have led to budget difficulties and filling station bottlenecks all over the Comecon area.

Even in the GDR, which has hitherto enjoyed a special position by virtue of treaty arrangements between Bonn and the East Bloc and its special relationship with the Soviet Union, economic indicators point to difficulties.

Indebtedness to the West and interest payments on Western loans eat up much of the foreign exchange earned by countries all over the East Bloc.

Hungary alone, having reintroduced small-scale free enterprise, especially in the service trades, and borrowed, in industry, from the free market system, seems to be faring better than the rest.

How does the Soviet Union propose to cope with stagnation and crises in the years ahead? Mr Brezhnev's answer is simple enough:

It is urgently necessary "to provide an unfailing system of material incentive to stimulate people to produce more and improve the quality of output."

This is easily said, but nothing has been done. Ideologists are against reforms in the Soviet Union itself, reforms such as were envisaged by Alexei Kosygin, and reform in Poland has been nipped in the bud.

Peter Seidlitz

(Handelsblatt, 22 December 1981)

The German Tribune

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
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■ HOME AFFAIRS

FDP faces danger of becoming the fourth party



Everybody talks about the crisis in the SPD while problems of the FDP are mentioned almost in passing.

This is a little strange. For it is the FDP, the smaller of the coalition partners, that faces the greater danger.

If the worst comes to the worst, the SPD will only shrink. It would remain one of the two major political parties.

Bu the FDP can only be wiped out if it gets any smaller.

There are several reasons for the threat to its existence.

One is that it is about to lose its powerful function as the party that tips the scales.

With the rise of the Greens (environmentalists) the FDP faces a danger of becoming the fourth party.

This would not be merely a change in the popularity table. It would mean an end to its special role over the years that has given it great say in the decision-making progress.

This role has variedly been described as the "king maker" or the "impossibility of not being governed by the FDP".

And in certain phases of the Social-Liberal coalition, FDP leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher was openly regarded as the nation's most powerful man.

There is a kernel of truth in such descriptions.

The Free Democrats have always had a say in fundamental policy decisions in Bonn, ranging from the market economy to *Ostpolitik*.

So have they in the "change of course" in Bonn's fiscal and economic policy which Genscher announced.

Anybody intent on governing must reckon with the Free Democrats.

Its position is weaker in the *Länder*, where its organisation is not as strong. As a result, it is in the *Länder* that the erosion process is now becoming most visible.

The Berlin election in May 1981 is a telling example. The "Alternative Ticket" (a wide conglomeration of environmentalists) cornered more seats than the FDP. This meant that the Free Democrats could no longer choose a coalition partner (SPD or CDU).

Since the traditional parties were unwilling to form a coalition with the environmentalists and the SPD rejected a grand coalition there remained only one combination that would have provided a majority: CDU-FDP.

No such coalition was officially announced. But it in fact exists.

There is much to indicate that this trend will continue in the 1982 state elections. And it matters little whether the Greens manage to get into the state assemblies. What does matter is that the FDP's free choice of coalition partners is dwindling.

In Lower Saxony, a coalition between SPD and FDP seems ouf of the question if polls are anything to go by because the two parties together would not get enough seats.

In Hamburg, the Greens now stand a better chance of getting in than the Liberals. Polls show here as well that the SPD and FDP together will not get a majority.

In Hesse (like in Lower Saxony), the Greens might find it difficult to overcome the five per cent hurdle and so get in. But there, too, the prospects of an SPD-FDP majority are pretty slim.

And in Bavaria the CSU needs no coalition partner as the SPD and FDP are fairly insignificant.

The uncertainties are reflected in the disputes among the Liberals as to which partner to opt for before the elections.

In Lower Saxony, the FDP decided not to let itself to be pinned down at all.

This might make sense in some cases, as for instance in Bavaria and in Baden-Württemberg where the conservative majority is unchallengeable. But in Lower Saxony it only causes confusion and is bad public relations.

In Hamburg, there are indications that it will favour the SPD, but it would leave a loophole for a way out in emergency: after all, it is perfectly conceivable that SPD and FDP together will not be strong enough to form a majority.

The FDP's coalition partner problems are not only due to lack of leadership. They also have to do with the fact that the old method of stressing the FDP's importance by opting for one party or another is no longer convincing.

The FDP can no longer tip the scales to the left or the right. There are, after all, the Greens.

The traditional mechanics of the party system are out of alignment. The FDP now cannot automatically expect to be elected due to its coalition with a stronger party. It must try to make itself attractive to the voter by its political ideas and its platform. But what exactly is the FDP? This is another reason for the party's jeopardy. The Liberals are the smallest of the popular parties yet they have the largest political scope. They are a receptacle for the orthodox champions of a free market economy, an industrial growth society and (but this has become rare now) environmental protection.

More than ever before, the FDP now provides a haven for the bourgeoisie, for whom emancipation has already gone too far.

It also provides a home for those who show more understanding for alternative ways of life and peripheral groups (like the gays) than followers of other parties.

The FDP differs according to the various planes of its organisation.

The Bundestag caucus essentially represents a traditionalist-bourgeois party along the lines of Lambsdorff and Genscher. In fact, coalition with the SPD has become a burden which some FDP MPs would like to shrug off as soon as they can.

This bourgeois element is even stronger among the grassroots members and followers.

But the FDP is still a pretty radical social-liberal grouping among its middle echelon (delegates to state and national party congresses). It is here that the social-liberalism has crystallised in its most persistent form.



(Cartoon: Oskar/Berliner Morgenpost)

This explains the party's attempts to change its structure from the ground up through a selective recruiting of members.

The FDP is aware of the danger that the "four-power system" that has already evolved in the Länder will spread to national politics.

This need not mean that the Greens will take the five per cent hurdle and move into the Bundestag. But the Greens and other alternative groups together with the peace movement could wrest enough votes from the SPD-FDP to make it impossible for them to form a majority government.

The FDP must come to terms with the fact that its stand will become tougher in a four-power system. The Liberals will find it impossible to integrate the Greens and other alternative groupings and yet remain the champion of industrial interests within the coalition. They can also no longer hope that, by choosing a chancellorship candidate like Franz Josef Strauss, the conservatives will drive some of their own voters into the FDP fold.

The FDP's traditional response to problems within one coalition has been to opt for another, thus redefining its role with a different partner.

This is the reason for the occasional expressions of disenchantment with the SPD and the talk of dwindling common ground with the present coalition partner. This also explains the invisible yet continuous change among the FDP's members and followers as it explains the many CDU-FDP coalitions in local government.

The FDP cannot dump the SPD yet because the chancellor's policy provides little opportunity.

Also Genscher has repeatedly avowed his intention to continue in the present government.

Moreover, the ascent of the Greens means that it is no longer certain that the FDP is actually needed as a coalition partner. This forces the Liberals to draft their own policy independent of a partner.

Essentially, the Liberals are faced with the same question as their Social Democratic partners: With whom do we face the future? Which common ideas are to cement a coalition? What is to be the shape of the Free Democratic Party of tomorrow and what is it to stand for?

There is no indication that the FDP has already found the answers to these questions. As a result, the Liberals have every reason to be worried about the future. The eight per cent vote of which pollsters assure them is no life insurance.

Rolf Zundel

(Die Zeit, 25 December 1981)

Bonn coalition demonstrates a will to survive

The Bonn coalition has pulled itself together after five months of turbulence. It has forcefully demonstrated that it has the will to survive.

This was shown in the austerity package that was rejected in the Bundesrat. It went back to the Bundestag and passed with flying colours.

And this was despite the fact that it contained such unpopular measures as increased taxes on alcohol and tobacco, cutbacks in child allowance and higher social security contributions.

The trouble is that the old problems will be succeeded by new ones.

Some of the problems cast their shadows even before Christmas.

For instance, the CDU-CSU *Länder* decided to withhold from Bonn DM1bn they believe they are entitled to under a complicated financial system. The whole thing boils down to yet another hole in Bonn's fiscal policy.

There is also some talk of further tax increases. The pros and cons of government job-creation programmes are under discussion again and will have to be decided soon.

There is also rumour of a 1983 economy programme, the 1982 operation having only just managed to get off the ground.

To make matters worse, there are those in Bonn who ask themselves whether the finance minister's heart and the economic affairs minister's reputation are firm enough to keep the coalition together.

The Bundestag debate will hit the SPD-FDP coalition at its weakest spot: as soon as unemployment figures hit the two million mark, one of the partners will demand an investment programme worth billions while the other will point to the self-healing properties of our market economy.

The next economising debate will once more boil down to fighting it out between the alleged interests of the "man-in-the-street" and the privileges of the "haves".


This type of debate is of course not peculiar to left-liberal coalition governments nor is it typically German.

It is simply a common by-product of conomic crises – not only in Germany and not only for a few months.

Dieter Piel

(Die Zeit, 25 December 1981)





■ DEFENCE

How Spain's membership will change the face of Nato

Spain's accession to Nato will create a new geo-strategic power triangle. The inclusion in Nato of the whole of the Iberian Peninsula means the establishment of a land bridge to Nato member Portugal and an expansion of the alliance's maritime zone of influence.

The Nato region will then encompass the Azores, Madeira and the Balearics. In strategic terms this means that the opposite coast will then not only be the edge of America but of Africa as well.

Since Spain has traditionally maintained good political relations with the Arab countries, it will be able to exert its influence on its Islamic neighbours for the good of the alliance.

Morocco, a conservative Moslem state, will then be brought closer to European politics.

Spain's inclusion in the Atlantic security system also upgrades Portugal the other Iberian member.

Portugal's Azores are a strategic trump card.

As far back as World War II, Lisbon allowed America to establish bases on the islands of Tercire and Santa Maria.

The Lajes Base has been the most important strategic turnstile for the US Air Force since 1951. The Portuguese let America use the base free of charge until 1979.

Now, Washington pays an annual US$140m. In return, the Pentagon has the full use of all facilities.

Spain will provide the same number of bases as a Nato partner as it has done hitherto on a bilateral basis with the United States.

But the Spanish-American agreement will acquire a European dimension.

With Torrejon near Madrid, Europe's largest military airport, the alliance will receive a base that will provide an ideal staging area for the Nato air force.

Nato will also receive the San Jurgo Air Base, also near Madrid, and Moron de la Frontera near Seville plus the sea and air base at Rota near Cadiz.

Should Spain actually be a member by next spring's Nato conference, the special agreements regarding the delineation of the common strategic zone of interests between Spain and America would be extended to apply to Nato.

Washington and Madrid delineated the sea and land area for a uniform common strategy in January 1976.

The first interest zone extends as far as the 23rd meridian West and the 23rd parallel North.

It thus encompasses both European and African spheres of interest.

The second zone is in the Mediterranean and extends from Gibraltar to Sardinia.

Spain is a Mediterranean power with a major interest in the operations of America's 6th Fleet.

Moreover, the treaties provide for America to play a direct part in defending Spain.

These guarantees would instantly be taken over by Nato since the Treaty's preamble states that an attack on the national territory of a member state is to be deemed an attack on the alliance as a whole.

How Spain is to be fitted into the military command structure of Nato is still to be decided. But it can be taken for granted that the alliance will meet the wishes of the new partner.

It is certain that Spain will lay claim to a "supreme command" and that this will be granted.

The command will reflect the importance of the new power triangle.

But it will also be governed by the gradient of power. Portugal will play a subordinate role in the chain of command while Spain, with its larger land area, stronger military forces and the bastion which provides America and Nato with their most important bases, will provide the commander-in-chief.

But since Portugal remains the natural supplement of the Iberian complex and since Nato's new pillar would be strategically ineffectual without Lisbon, this would in no way detract from Portugal's special role.

Lisbon's close ties with Brazil mean that the Atlantic alliance can be extended into the South Atlantic. This, too, will be reflected in the command structure of the new Iberian complex.

The geo-strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula must, however, not be permitted to cloud the assessment of Portugal's and Spain's armed forces.

Portugal's army has shrunk in manpower since the revolution. But modernisation has also been attempted.

The present strength is 27,000. Close to 10,000 form part of the only mobile operating unit, the 1st Mixed Brigade.

The other units are scattered in various regiments throughout the country. They are only conditionally operational because of their poor equipment.

Portugal's small navy and its inadequate air force are obsolete. If the country is to gain more military and political influence on the alliance's decision-making processes, it will have to rethink.

This means building up its navy and modernising its airforce while the army could be reduced still further. But the equipment provided by the allies would have to be used more selectively.

Spain will have to accustom its forces to the Atlantic atmosphere. After a decade of colonial warfare, Portugal at last has an army that is amazingly willing to adapt to Atlantic thought processes.

The Spanish army, on the other hand has only few officers with combat experience — and what experience they have dates back to the Civil War.

As long as Civil War memories remain effective in the minds of these officers it will be difficult to transform this mentality into that of Atlantic alliance needs.

Nato officers recognise the priority of politics. It remains to be seen to which extent Spain's officer corps is prepared to adopt the same attitude.

Adelbert Weinstein
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 11 December 1981)

International security report under strong criticism

A team of Tübingen political scientists has strongly criticised an international report on security.

The report, produced by the foremost foreign affairs research institutes of America, France, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, is called "The West and International Security."

This very title, says Professor Volker Rittberger, who headed the team, demonstrates "egocentrism in terms of security policy" by the heads of the four institutes.

Anybody who thought only of his own security was unaware of the need for a security partnership.

This one-track view of security and the predominantly military options in safeguarding it, as presented in the institutes' paper, are the focal points of the Tübingen study.

Several essays in the study (they are not clearly separated and therefore full of avoidable repetition) deal with various aspects of this criticism.

Berthold Meyer tries to prove that this type of "security policy with blinkers does not reduce the existing risks but in all likelihood heightens them."

Man has always had to think in security categories in order to survive. But this, writes Meyer, is jeopardised by uncertainty, a false feeling of security and a security fanaticism that prompts man to think that he must make provisions for any possible contingency.

Meyer believes that he can discern these elements in the institutes' paper.

Joachim Betz lends additional depth to these ideas in his analysis of the military options in the Third World raised in the institutes' paper — especially in connection with a possible threat to the Western industrial nations' oil supplies.

The directors of the institutes expressly termed the new American Rapid Deployment Force a necessary and useful instrument in safeguarding Western interests.

Betz tries to prove that a military response by the West would fail to achieve the desired effect in any of the four contingencies mentioned in the institutes' paper.

Be it an intervention by the Soviet Union or ethnic rivalries or revolutions in the oil-producing countries or a new Israeli-Arab war, military intervention by the West would not ensure oil supplies to the industrial nations.

On the contrary, says Betz. The very fact of being prepared for a military intervention must exacerbate internal crises and bring about disruptions in the oil supply — disruptions resulting from internal conflicts that might not have arisen, given a certain detachment.

These are the most convincing passages of the Tübingen study. The zero in on a central point of the institutes' paper and show feasible alternatives.

Berthold Meyer's proposals aimed at overcoming the prevailing security policy concepts by unilateral confidence-building measures are perhaps out of place in the current political constellation.

But we shall have to examine time and again in the future to which extent it is possible to resort to such unilateral measures in a bid to convince the other side of one's peaceful intentions without jeopardising security needs.

Even if the authors of the Tübingen study reject it as an example, the Nato decision is a step in this (right) direction.

In no way convincing are those essays in the Tübingen study that try to present new and alternative defence concepts.

It can rightly be said that there are some irrational elements in the Nato doctrine. But then, it is its unpredictability that makes the doctrine tick.

This unpredictability is not a deliberate creation of the strategists. It is the product of the weapons systems on which our security concept rests and of the threat which we want to counter by it.

Erwin Müller is right in his "analysis of the threat" when he says that the only military danger comes from the Soviet potential. He goes on to say that this potential in itself is not a threat unless there is a hostile intention.

But this latter contention is open to doubt because it operates on the assumption that a country could engage in an unprecedented arms build-up for no good reason whatsoever — an arms build-up that goes far beyond legitimate defence requirements.

It goes without saying that the very existence of a military potential constitutes a threat.

Müller's ideas regarding the values that are threatened by the Soviets are just naive. As he sees it, these values are above all the ownership of the means of production plus human rights and freedom.

The loss of the first, he says, would "affect only a small group of the socially privileged." But he omits to say what consequences would arise from the inadequate planned economy system which has brought Poland to the edge of an abyss.

And when Müller then goes on to minimise the defence-worthiness of human rights, saying that this applies only where they are not restricted any way, he does not promote the credibility of the Tübingen study as an alternative political strategy.

The ideas on the restructuring of the Bundeswehr and the amendments of strategy and tactics are totally inadequate.

The main ideas here is the return to a minimum deterrent that would ensure the capability to deal a second strike but no more.

At the same time, says Müller, we would have to create a conventional force with a purely defensive structure.

But even if such a restructuring were possible, a conventional war (that would become more likely because, given such a restructuring, there would be no nuclear threat to the enemy) would have disastrous consequences for Germany.

So all that would remain would be the hope that such a restructuring would be rewarded by corresponding measures on the other side.

Failing this, it would be too late to think yet again.

Siegesmund von Ilsemann
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 18 December 1981)

■ MANAGEMENT

Fifth columnist all but wrecks course on how to beat environment protests

A course aimed at teaching management how to handle environmental protest campaigns very nearly fell at the first environmental hurdle.

One of the participants revealed himself to be an environmental campaigner.

He had enrolled as a member of *Arbeitskreis Chemische Industrie,* which could have been an industrial lobbying organisation.

But it wasn't. And the others in the class were not at all happy at having a fifth columnist in the classroom.

It didn't help either, when one participant explained how the *Arbeitskreis* operated. He said they had published deliberately misleading reports of poisoned drinking water in the Cologne area.

The public relations man whose firm was running the course for the Hohenstein Institute explained brightly that a course for both environmentalists and management could be arranged. It would be a splendid idea.

But not right now.

After, all what he had to say included confidential information based on practical experience of other clients.

He was not able to divulge this confidential information to all and sundry. That would make the course much less useful.

The environmental man was not impressed by this argument. He had paid his fee and wanted his money's worth.

With the situation in a stalemate, Herr Hohenstein descended in person from his hotel room.

He spoke outside the clasroom with the environmental man. Inside, the rest of the class held a secret ballot which decided by a majority that the outsider should indeed stay outside.

But in the meantime, Herr Hohenstein, a suave and imposing figure, had come to a compromise: the campaigner would go, but he could take the course file with him.

This wasn't at all popular with some of the others. The file included the names and addresses of everyone on the course and, as someone said, you never can tell what might happen.

After an hour's delay, the course began, without the intruder.

The Hohenstein Institute is just one of several companies that has begun this line of courses. Theirs costs DM490 plus VAT, a bargain when it is considered that a course in autogenic training costs well over twice as much.

Over a dozen factory-owners, managers and public relations officers (plus the environmentalist) turned up for the course, at the Steigenberger Hotel, in Bonn. One company even sent three men.

Two instructors came from Düsseldorf. They were the owners of Apitz, Kothes & Partners, a public relations company.

Klaus Apitz said his agency handled political accounts and just about everythng there was in public relations, especially image cosmetics and crisis management.

They were what the Bonn course was all about. When environmental campaigners start picketing at the factory gate a company is in trouble.

Herr Apitz began by reading from a manuscript of his entitled Fundamental Aspects of Public Opinion. It summarised a course on the subject for first-year university students.

The initial quotation seemed to impress the management men. It was taken from Epictetus, the Ancient Greek philosopher.

"It is not so much the facts that decide matters in our social life," he wrote, "but the opinions people hold on the facts, and even opinions about the opinions."

This quotation is nearly 2,000 years old but it seemed to have taken the words out of the mouth of most people in the room.

The aim of this introductory lecture was to demonstrate the extent to which political decisions could be delayed by a vociferous and determined minority.

The effect minorities can have on the course of events was illustrated in a film about the violent protest demonstrations on the site of the proposed Brokdorf nuclear power station back in 1976.

The film was slanted. It drew a clear contrast between mindless militants on the one hand and peace-loving workmen and guardians of the law on the other.

The police naturally had everyone's best interests at heart. But people at the course did not conform to the usual cliches. They were not unpleasant capitalists.

Most felt the film was too tendentious. They did not agree that all demonstrators were tarred with the same brush. Not all were left-wingers and could be dismissed as Reds.

This meant that the film had had the desired effect. It had triggered a group process. Psychotherapeutic methods are no longer limited to doctors' surgeries.

It certainly got the course talking. "In society nowadays," one man said, "you are automatically against something or other." Another complained that even children already had preconceived ideas about environmental issues. "It's what they teach 'em at school," a third concluded.

Politicians also came in for criticism. A Berlin businessman who for years had been at daggers drawn with environmentalists and the authorities said Richard von Weizsäcker, the city's new mayor, was no improvement.

If anything, the situation was worse. Under the Christian Democrats life was even worse than under the Social Democrats, he said.

Another participant was still aggrieved by a comment Alfred Dregger, the Christian Democratic leader in Hesse, had once made. Asked if he would like to live next door to a nuclear power station, he had replied:

"It doesn't have to be right next door, does it?"

The course was evidently amazed at Dr Dregger letting the side down so, but the man who told the tale said: "It's true. He really said that."

Once people had let off steam a little Herr Apitz returned to the theoretical part of the programme.

He reviewed the course the environmental debate had taken since 1960 and outlined its significance in the current situation. He had a few home truths to tell.

An opinion poll had checked which sources of information were most likely to be believed on environmental issues; spokesmen for industry cut a poor figure.

Only three per cent of the people questioned were prepared to take at face value what industrial spokesmen said on issues of this kind.

Scientists on the other hand were felt to be extremely trustworthy. Sixty-three per cent were prepared to believe what they had to say.

Then came the field: politicians, civil servants, the Press. All trailed well behind the scientists but were much more credible than industrial spokesmen.

That made the course stop and think. So did the results of a poll of young people, most of whom agreed wholeheartedly with the following statement:

"I reckon we are well on the way to poisoning ourselves with the increasing pollution of the environment."

This figured high on the list of views on prospects for the future even among young people who might be expected to step in the shoes of the present generation of industrial management.

One participant commented that it looked like they were going to have to undertake public relations work even among Roman Catholic mothers' associations.

This comment sounded somewhat out of place in the circumstances. The facts did not exactly support the arguments advanced by industry, so Herr Apitz made his first recommendation.

In dealing with environmental campaigners, he said, managements should bear in mind that it was bad policy to sing one's own praises.

Industry could well present its environmental protection work in a better light by publishing what he called social balance sheets.

This is not a new idea. Admen have long advised clients to do good and tell the world about it. It is good advice as long as good is really done.

After lunch there was work in smaller groups. Group games were played to gain experience at handling situations, with Klaus Apitz and P. J. Kothes working as therapists.

There were three groups. One group were businessmen who wanted to build a nuclear power station. Another were environmentalists who were against the project. The third were the authorities.

Each group used and outlined in turn the means at their disposal. In the end the power station had been built and the protesters had failed.

This exercise had some effect, at least on the participants who acted out the role of the environmentalists. They experienced what it was like to lose out all along the way.

"If this is the way it actually happens," one said, "it is hardly surprising the environmentalists feel frustrated. There is is obviously a serious risk of escalation."

The general conclusion reached by everyone was that real power was only in the hands of the authorities and of companies.

Further exercises were held to develop strategies by which to deal with civic protest groups. The instructors suggested a wide range of options.

You could discuss with them, accept their demands, insist on acceptance of your own or do nothing at all. It depended on the circumstances.

Each approach had its advantages and disadvantages. Staunchly opposing environmental campaigners left people knowing exactly where they stood but it tended to heighten the impression that management were an ugly lot.

The recommendations made could not be made other than as a choice between options. Each case had to be judged on its individual merits.

What was important was not to leave anything to chance. Participants were given a check list specifying everything they must bear in mind.

It extended from the overall political climate to the closer concerns and environs of the individual company. It was also important to have a clear idea of what motivated the other side.

Apitz and Kothes suggested it might be a good idea to consult the police and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the domestic counter-intelligence agency.

Do they seriously advise industry to join forces with the *Verfassungsschutz* in dealing with environmentalists? Surely this is going too far.

What would companies say if environmentalists were to consult the *Verfassungsschutz* to monitor the environmental pollution for which industry was responsible?

Towards the end of the course time ran short, but brevity was the soul of the final advice given to companies faced by environmental campaigners.

There were three recommendations, none new in itself, truisms even: take 'em seriously, avoid conflicts and draw up a public relations concept.

Wolfgang Hoffmann
(Die Zeit, 25 December 1981)

■ COMMERCE

Protection the name of the textiles game

The history of commerce shows that the spirit of protectionism, once let out of the bottle, is almost impossible to control.

This is now being demonstrated again by the World Textile Agreement (WTA). Its future is now being negotiated in Geneva between the European Community, the USA and the developing countries of the Group of 77.

The aim is to use import quotas to curb Third World access to the textile and clothing markets of industrial nations.

This blatant protectionist agreement was made socially acceptable by the United States in 1974 in a bid to give its ailing textiles industry some breathing space.

When it was first extended in 1977 the EEC countries jumped on the bandwagon and concluded 35 agreements with developing countries.

Protectionist measures become indispensable.

So the WTA did not lapse, thanks to the current negotiations for its extension.

The outcome will probably be that access to markets will be restricted still further for the threshold countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Brazil.

Otherwise Europe's textiles industry fears "protectionist chaos".

Even Bonn Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff, who the textile workers union has labelled a "super liberal", said about the WTA: "Things being as they are, we have no choice but to employ Lucifer to drive out the devil."

Indeed, the situation in the German textiles industry is difficult. With its sales (1980) of DM54bn and a work force of 500,000, it is Germany's most important consumer goods branch of industry.

In the past ten years, one in four textile workers has lost his job; and the situation in the other EEC countries is no better.

Diminishing employment should be no argument in favour of protectionist measures in a country that has always stood up for free trade because — like the Federal Republic of Germany — it depends on exports and protectionism can only backfire.

But the industrial countries are not making it all that easy for themselves. They justify trade restrictions by pointing to the low wages in the Third World and to export subsidies.

This, they figure, gives them the right to demand a transition period without competition in order to gain the time for necessary structural changes and so maintain their own competitiveness.

The question is: are these reasons valid and are they enough to justify tightening the protectionist screw, as provided for in the common EEC negotiating paper?

The argument that the developing countries pay low wages is not very plausible. However one twists and turns it, the "exploitation argument" makes sense only when applied to those countries that want to make their imports more expensive as a means of curbing them.

For the Third World countries, however, any artificial price increase of their foremost production factor, labour, is intolerable since this would mean lower exports and hence fewer jobs.

For that matter, Germany was also a low wage country until the mid-1960s and it is largely this to which it owes its economic rise — and its present economic woes in the wake of its change to a high wage country.

The cost per working hour in the textiles industry now stands at DM17.10, which makes it the third highest in the world.

In the USA, it is the equivalent of DM11.70, in Japan DM8.50 and in Hong Kong DM2.60.

Naturally, the burden of high wages has accelerated structural change.

According to OECD figures, productivity per worker rose by an annual 5.6 per cent 1973 and 1978, following 7.3 per cent in the three previous years.

Germany's textiles industry thus shows the highest productivity increase after Finland's.

OECD figures also show that the drop in employment is 92 per cent due to the rise in productivity and only 8 per cent to the drop in output.

In France and Britain, on the other hand, dwindling employment is 43 and 84 per cent respectively due to declining output.

Those two countries have done little to modernise, which means that their textile companies are particularly endangered.

As opposed to the British and French textiles industries (and to ssome extent those of other EEC countries), the Germans did not take it easy under the shelter of the WTA.

They realised in time that those who pocket gains on the domestic market due to protectionism will soon be the losers on world markets.

It seems obvious that the WTA is unsuitable as a means of providing a breathing space to facilitate adaptation.

And then there is the argument that the WTA prevents distortions of the conditions of competition through export subsidies in developing countries which lead to a situation in which it is no longer the true cost that determines prices. But it is doubtful whether this can only be remedied by the big guns of a World Textile Agreement.

It is no secret that the German textiles and cloting industry is not so much concerned about export subsidies in the Third World, as about the subsidies mentality among EEC countries.

Direct subsidies in Belgium, cheap credits in France and the nationalisation and continued operation of ailing textile and clothing companies in Italy are cases in point.

This tide of assistance — the list includes many other countries — is the true threat to the German industry.


The textile and clothing industries in Germany export 86 and 95 per cent respectively to other industrial countries (total exports to those countries amount to an annual DM16.3bn). And 70 per cent of the imports totalling DM26bn come from industrial nations.

This shows the effect distortions of conditions of competition by our most important trading partners can have on the German industry.

The threat comes from there rather than the Far East.

Gottfried Eggerbauer

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 11 December 1981)



(Cartoon: Bruns/Der Tagesspiegel)

Bickering among EEC nations hits fishing industry

A state of apparently permanent dispute among EEC nations is hitting Germany's fishing industry.

Low catches are damaging the processing and wholesaling industries and, although the consumer has an adequate supply, prices have risen and quality has dropped.

Only 40 per cent of West Germany's annual demand of 650,000 tons is taken by German ships.

Main reason is that an agreement for EEC nations to fish off Canada's coast has not come into force.

Britain had vetoed the agreement, but eventually agreed to lift the objection.

Now the Danes, and to a lesser extent the Belgians, oppose agreements between Germany and non-EEC nations.

But the problem for the Federal Republic dates to the mid 1970s, when almost all countries in the North Atlantic, including EEC members, extended fishing zones to 200 miles and imposed catch quotas.

This hit Germany's sophisticated fleet hard. Since 1979 14 ships have been put out of commission.

A spokesman says: "All we are landing is red figures, not fish."

The recently postponed EEC Council of Ministers' meetings have reduced early relief.

Bonn assistance measures boil down to a drop in the ocean.

All that the Bundestag Budget Committee has allocated to distant water fisheries for 1982 is DM13m. Another DM3m has been earmarked for the inshore fishing industry.

In 1981, the industry benefited to the tune of DM30m of the DM33m allocated by Bonn.

The austerity measures have clearly not stopped short of the fishing industry.

In any event, the fishermen themselves are in two minds about federal assistance. "What we need is fish, not subsidies," they say.

If, like last year, Germany's fishermen are barred from the coastal waters of Canada (Labrador and Newfoundland), nothing will stop the decline of the industry.

The Canadian fishing would enable the German fleet to net 15,000 tons of cod.

But time is crucial because the season extends only from December to March.

After that time, the skippers of Germany's 18 factory trawlers and 13 other deep sea trawlers can only twiddle their thumbs.

The complaints now are not as strong as they were a year ago, primarily because fishing rights off the Faroe Islands are helping to ease the situation.

There is also the framework treaty with Norway, extending over ten years. But the details have to be renegotiated every year.

In any event, none of this can offset the loss of the cod catches off Canada.

Germany's distant water fishermen have had their problems with fishing grounds since 1972, when Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing zone for foreign vessels.

In the mid-1970s, when almost all North Atlantic countries (including those in the EEC) extended their zones to 200 miles and restricted the catch quotas, Germany's sophisticated fleet had to be reduced considerably. Fourteen vessels have been scrapped since 1979.

But the actual crisis is due to the permanent dispute within the EEC. Although the differences between Britain and France (concerning exclusive British catch rights within the 12-mile zone) have been defused, there is no settlement in sight.

Now it is the Danes (and to some extent the Belgians) who for domestic reasons oppose agreements between the German fishing industry and non-EEC nations.

The drop in already low catches (the German fishing industry accounts for less than 40 per cent of our 650,000-ton domestic demand) is naturally affecting other sectors of the industry as well.

The processing industry, which has so far only just managed to survive, is now also faced with mounting difficulties.

The same applies to the wholesale business. The two areas still employ around 11,000 people; but there is less and less work for them because much of the imported fish is already processed.

The German consumer market has not yet suffered. The supply of both fresh and frozen fish is adequate.

But the quality has suffered and prices have gone up. The change to unconventional types of fish is not necessarily a solution.

Dominik Schmidt

(Die Welt, 17 December 1981)

■ AGRICULTURE

Farmers badly hit by rising cost of land

The rocketing cost of land is at the heart of the German farmers' problems.

Farmers need to expand if they are to maintain affluence.

This means that they must buy land. Land is getting more and more expensive because demand far exceeds supply.

A major reason is that there are many wealthy buyers in the market besides farmers.

Many are former farmers who have made a lot of money by selling their land for housing projects.

With this money they are able to outbid their former farming colleagues.

If this capital gained from land sales is reinvested in farmland within two years it is not liable to income tax.

The law should be changed to dampen this demand. This would entail a change in the two-year provision.

The farmer must increase production all the time. One way is by improving feeding and using the most efficient fertilisers.

Another is by increasing prices. But this is often impossible. The only alternative is to increase production by acquiring more land, or more livestock.

Even those farmers who have opted to buy more livestock need more land, because more livestock means more animal feed, and it is cheaper to produce the feed on one's own farm than to buy it.

To make matters more complicated, there is a regulation by which farmers are divided into those who are still regarded as agricultural cattle breeders and those who are deemed to raise cattle on an industrial basis.

Farmers whose livestock exceeds a specific limit without the minimum area of land that goes with it are no longer regarded as farmers but as industrial operators and lose certain tax advantages.

This means that increasing a herd necessitates buying additional land if the business is to remain viable.

Only 0.2 per cent a year of Germany's agricultural land changes hands (about 25,000 to 30,000 hectares of a total of 13 million).

Since it costs between DM13,000 and DM75,000 per hectare, and sometimes more, additional land is beyond the reach of most farmers.

The prices are particularly high considering the per hectare yield of about DM25,000 for prime land.

The demand is therefore concentrated on land for lease because the prices here, though constantly rising, have nevertheless been kept in line with the yield.

Leased land accounts for about one-third of Germany's farm land.

But the leasing market is also tight, and here, too, demand exceeds supply.

Whenever new leasehold land comes on the market whole villages compete for it. The land starvation has reached the point where farmers will lease land far removed from the home farm, sometimes up to 40km away.

This forces them to use low loading trailers to transport tractors and other farming equipment back and forth.

Other financially potent competitors on the land market are: mammoth farms, hobby farmers with high earnings outside farming, industrial enterprises with agricultural interests (such as sugar factories), public sector corporations operating with public money, and well-to-do non-farmers who want for a number of reason.

This has led to complaints about the fact that small family farms that need the land for survival because they are too small to live on and too big to starve on are placed at a disadvantage.

It is these farmers who believe that they are meant when German politicians stress time and again that family farms must be preserved.

The trouble is that, no matter how praiseworthy the objective, politicians have been unable to stop the number of these farms from dwindling.

Farmers, their organisations and agricultural policy makers are now trying to remedy the situation. They are contemplating government measures to stop the soaring prices for farm land and to control the selling and leasing in a way that would channel the available land to family farms.

Certain protective laws, among them those governing options and price limits for leasehold land, have already been enacted; but many farmers hold that this is not enough.

The law on leasehold land is now to be made more stringent by digging up some old proposals and revamping them. But all this would amount to would be trying to cure symptoms and even more red tape. Such legislation would do little good other than to safeguard the jobs of our agricultural bureaucracy.

What would help would be legal provisions to curb demand — especially the demand created by the necessity to reinvest in land.

It is this fiscal necessity to buy new land within two years that has created the enormous demand and made prices skyrocket.

This should be buttressed by measures to remove the existing curbs on the willingness of landowners to sell or lease their property. They should include job opportunities for farmers in non-farming sectors.

The other contemplated measures are useless. State intervention in market forces has always backfired and harmed those who were supposed to benefit by it.

Klaus Peter Krause

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 15 December 1981)

The humble spud comes back in a dinner jacket

The potato, which made a bad name for itself in the 1970s as the weightwatcher's bane, has come into its own again.

Not only have sales recovered, but entirely new products now dominate the frozen foods sections of supermarkets.

The range of potato products extends from chips to home fries and scores of other dishes.

But there is also another side to the potato renaissance. Changed consumer habits have led to steep price increases for the most German of staples.

Not only are prices for ready made frozen potato dishes several hundred per cent higher than those of the raw material; but the ordinary potato has developed over the years from a commodity bought by the hundredweight for storage in the basement to the "farmer's gold" sold by the pound as if it were a great delicacy.

The designation "farmer's gold" was introduced by the Central Marketing Corporation of German Agriculture (CMA) which is pushing the German potato as gourmet food.

But CMA quality claims and reality are far apart. The "farmer's gold" marketed in colourful plastic bags is frequently rotten — literally.

Those who still have a dark and dry basement with the space for a crate of potatoes must count themselves lucky.

Unfortunately, modern housing design does not take this need into account. Every square metre is precious and when it comes to the alternative "potatos or disco basement", the decision is inevitably a foregone conclusion.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 December 1981)

Better grape crop not enough to boost wine production

The German grape harvest in 1981 yielded 55 per cent more wine than in 1980.

But there won't be any more wine available because of the industry's stabilisation arrangements.

"We will only just manage," said a representative of the wine stabilisation fund.

The grape harvest was particularly bad in 1980, and imports partly made up the wine shortfall.

There was no increase in per capita wine consumption during 1981.

Prices for must this autumn are the same as last year. Consumer prices rose slightly — in any event less than for imported wines.

About 40 per cent of the 1981 vintage will be given the German Wine Board designation *Prädikatswein* (30 per cent will be cabernets) and 60 per cent will be designated *Qualitätswein*.

This means that the 1981 vintage will be considerably better than that of 1980.

Wine growers are evidently not at all dismayed at the fact that there will be only 9 per cent *Spätlese* and *Auslese* wines because sales figures show a clear trend towards cabernets.

The distribution of quality grades over the individual growing areas varies widely. While *Rheinpfalz*, *Rheinhessen*, *Nahe* and *Mittelrhein* will have about 10 to 11 per cent *Spätlese* wines, *Rheingau* will have only 2 per cent.


The current trend is towards dry or semi-dry which are gaining the upper hand not only among connoisseurs but also among the public at large.

A survey by the wine board shows that more than one-third of Germany's wines now fall in this category.

The wine industry has been outraged about imports with fancy *Rheinwein* labels bearing a microscopically fine print with the words "Produce of Austria".

But it is powerless to do anything.

(Handelsblatt, 16 December 1981)



■ REVIEW

Foreign policy under scrutiny: charting the course for the future

Foreign policy is back under scrutiny. The end of detente, the new US policy of strength and the peace movement in Western Europe have plunged Bonn into its gravest orientation crisis since the clash over rearmament and Western integration.

Basic consensus on foreign policy, which has even survived the Social and Free Democratic coalition's Ostpolitik, the details of which have often been controversial, now seems in jeopardy.

The conviction that defence capacity and detente must continue to be the mainstays of foreign policy, a policy that must remain based on membership of the Western alliance, is still held by a substantial majority both in the political parties and among the general public.

But there can be no ignoring those who, given increasing East-West confrontation, the arms build-up and a decline in willingness to compromise on arms control issues, warn against continuing as hitherto and call for consideration and trial of alternatives.

How seriously must these demands for a reappraisal of foreign policy essentials be taken? Have the framework conditions of Bonn's foreign policy changed to such an extent that aims and means must inevitably be adapted?

Or is a turning point in the offing, as it was in 1949 and 1969? Will it be marked by a decline in alliance solidarity and a desire for peace accompanied by a quest for an independent approach in which nationalist and neutralist elements will predominate and bloc viewpoints will be relegated to a minor role?

Answers to these and similar questions are attempted by a writer who has published several books on Bonn foreign policy:

Wolfram Hanrieder: *Fragmente der Macht. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik.* (Fragments of Power. The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic), R. Piper & Co. Verlag, Munich 1981, 194 pp. DM 18.

With a great deal of expertise and a balanced judgement Hanrieder analyses in three lengthy essays the key current problems facing the country in security policy, detente and Ostpolitik and the relationship between economic and foreign policy.

He prefaces them with a recapitulation of developments between 1949 and 1980, taking into account the domestic ramifications of foreign policy.

The book benefits enormously from the author's background. Hanrieder was born in Munich but has lectured at American universities since 1963.

First at Princeton, he is now at the University of California in Santa Barbara. He has served as a visiting professor at Munich, Brunwick, Kiel and elsewhere.

So he is one of the very few specialists who are equally at home in American and European politics. This gives his views a twofold perspective.

The conclusions he reaches here are sure to be sobering for those who advocate a dramatic change in Bonn foreign policy.

He concedes that East-West detente and the increasingly economic emphasis in world affairs, with its "realignment of military and economic power components," have increased Bonn's political clout, at least temporarily.

Bonn, like Western Europe as a whole, has grown more self-assured and is showing signs of an independence that stands in the way of what, in the 50s and 60s, was a clear US leadership.

On the other hand, fresh tension and demarcation bids in the early 80s are threatening to atrophy the dynamic aspect of German Ostpolitik and detente policy.

As for economic considerations, the Federal Republic today has long ceased to be an island of seemingly unlimited opportunities.

Hanrieder warns Bonn in particular not to overrate its potential in respect of reunification or association of the two German states.

The Federal Republic, he points out, has "since its inception had neither a diplomatic adversary nor a diplomatic partner who has honestly endorsed reunification of the two German states.'"

The division of Germany was and continues to be the key feature of the post-war order in Europe. It is a factor for stability both the superpowers and Germany's eastern and western neighbours are keen to maintain.

Were the Federal Republic of Germany to give rise to suspicions that it planned a revision of the status quo, it would find, Hanrieder says, that "a dynamic German Ostpolitik would from the outset run counter to the fundamental circumstances and interests of the United States."

Not for nothing does Hanrieder recall the early days of Ostpolitik as pursued by Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel.

Bonn was soon made to realise that its readiness to pursue a policy of detente must be accompanied by restraint. There were no longer any grand alternatives in German or European foreign policy.

In Europe today it was less a matter of the dramatic grand political designs of decades gone by than of short-term technical, economic and political targets.

Economic growth and stable currencies were felt to be what mattered, as were safeguards for energy and commodity supplies, constructive ties with the Third World and structural changes in the European Community.

This outlook is shared by most authors of a compendium of papers read at a 1979 conference of US and German experts held jointly by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, an organisation run by Germany's Christian Democrats (CDU), and the University of California's Santa Barbara campus:

Wolfram F. Hanrieder/Hans Rühle (Eds): *Im Spannungsfeld der Weltpolitik: 30 Jahre deutsche Außenpolitik 1949-1979)* (In the Stress Field of World Affairs: 30 Years of German Foreign Policy (1949-1979), Verlag Bonn Aktuell GmbH, Stuttgart 1981, 359 pp., DM39.

Since the papers were not adequately revised before publication the closest they come to the present is 1978/79.

So at times they sound a little outmoded by having missed out on the profound changes that have since taken place, such as the Nato deploy and-negotiate resolution on missile modernisation, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish crisis and the new administrations in Washington and Paris.

Developments in German-American ties are given pride of place in the book with the almost universal view being that, as Martin J. Hillenbrand puts it, relations between Bonn and Washington need taking better care of than in the past.

Neither the Americans nor the Germans can afford to allow each other to drift apart, says Jan Reifenberg.

The time has not yet come for Germany to make a bid for a greater say in the drafting of military strategy or in Nato military planning, says Catherine McArdle Kelleher.

As for a German policy of vacillating between East and West, that would be disastrous, says Manfred Wörner, CDU defence spokesman in Bonn.

US historial David Calleo also advises the Germans to prepare for a more adventurous future by studying their own past more carefully.

But he too warns that Europe is, in real terms, militarily weak in comparison with the Soviet Union and that nuclear armament poses frightening questions.

He sounds a warning note against a revival of the old anti-German coalition in Europe and advises Germany to be careful not to encourage its revival.

Given the current interest shown in what Peter Bender recently apostrophised as the Europeanisation of Europe, which is gaining support among Social Democrats, ideas of this kind must not be dismissed as old hat.

Even after over 30 years of reconstruction and consolidation in international crises, Bonn's foreign policy is still in greater jeopardy than many critics would have us believe.

In particular, its alliance with the United States remains indispensable. Anyone who fancies shaking its foundations must appreciate what that would entail.

Objectively, but clearly and definitely we are told just that in these two books.

Manfred Görtemaker

(Die Zeit, 4 December 1981)

The Germans as foreigners see them

Foreigners used to envy and admire the Germans for working so hard. They worked so hard that they were felt to be somehow alarming. Or so we used to believe.

But not any longer, according to *Der gefesselte Riese* (The Fettered Giant), a collection of essays on the Germans by foreign correspondents published by Econ Verlag of Düsseldorf.

Norman Crossland, the British journalist, says it is no longer true that most Germans live to work; they now work to live, like everyone else.

Michel Meyer, a French radio correspondent, quotes a 30-year-old German engineer who had returned from a stay in Bulgaria.

"The Bulgarians," he says, "still have time to live and talk with each other; they still have individual, personal ties."

He takes a much dimmer view of his fellow-countrymen: "I reckon we Germans are mad. Germany is a country of the possessed, of decline and fall, of the sick."

Yet Meyer concludes, after his interview with the German engineer: "His country is successful, but it also pays the highest human price for its success."

So do the Germans live to work after all? Meyer feels it is encouraging that a new generation of Germans so much as wonder what point there is in the sacrifices they make for financial and career success.

They wonder, too, whether Latin laxity and levity might not be a sign of intellectual health and common sense. But they do so in a manner that is typically German:

"Maybe they wonder too seriously, and that would be the wrong way to set about finding an answer."

Ramesh Jaura, an Indian and one of the editors of the collection, which deals mainly with political and economic problems, takes a similar view:

"Amazingly enough, the Germans are not in a position to really enjoy the prosperity they, or their fathers and mothers, have created."

"The Germans make outstanding power stations, sturdy cars and reliable washing machines," writes Norman Crossland, "but they hard produce anything that gives life that special something."

Ivan Lipovecz of Hungary feels the Germans have a mania for thrift that often hampers spontaneous enjoyment of life — even though it may be an incalculable economic advantage.

This is probably the point at which to mention the anxiety foreigners almost always notice among the Germans. Michel Meyer even feels this fear of the unknown and of the future is what makes them work so hard.

Don Franklin Jordan of the United States paints the least flattering picture of German characteristics. What strikes him is the mania for regulating anything and everything.

Let the public end up being satisfied or dissatisfied with rules and regulations, it hardly matters which. Order is order and it alone counts.

Yet despite compulsory driving lessons, the terror of compulsory roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles, traffic islands that are more like fortresses, there are, in relative terms, more victims of a lack of civic common sense in Germany than in America.

The constraint of regulations of all kinds logically leads to a behaviour pattern among Germans that combines subservience to the most meaningless regulations on the one hand and boasting about breaches of the law, be it speeding or tax evasion, on the other.

In part this subservience may, Jordan feels, be an attitude born of experience.

"Regardless whether it is a public authority, a private company or a welfare institution, the German is more likely to be bombarded with paragraphs by a lawyer than to have matters explained to him compassionately by a human being.

"It is hard indeed to divest oneself of the impression that more importance is attached to legal foundations in Germany than to standards of decency and humanity."

dpa

(Mannheimer Morgen, 19 December 1981)

■ ANTHROPOLOGY

The world's largest sports ground

An amateur archaeologist from Munich claims to have hit on the secret of the mysterious markings over 1,000 years old in the mountain plateau country of Nazca, Peru.

Patent lawyer Georg von Breunig say the markings, gigantic animal outlines and geometrical figures up to 30 miles long and six miles wide, are a sports complex.

This is a more plausible explanation than the one advanced by Erich Däniken, author of *Chariot of the Gods.* Däniken says they were spacercraft runways left by visitors from another planet.

Adventurers and archaeologists, amateur and professional, have long sought to explain the markings. Paul Kosok of the United States thought they were an astronomical calendar.

For 35 years Maria Reiche, a German mathematics teacher who lives in Peru, has been trying to back up this theory using a spade and a pencil.

Others have interpreted the triangles, zig-zags and spirals as vestiges of a totem cult, as a symbolic map of a lost empire or as a king-sized picture book of a pre-Columbian ruler.

And while Däniken took them to be traces of visitors from outer space, others have seen them as no more than an extensive programme of public works.

Breunig says they are the largest sports ground in the world. A 47-year-old with an electrical engineering degree, he had the idea while flying round the area. Scholars from all over the world have failed to come up with a really convincing explanation. Breunig looked down at the elongated triangles and immediately thought, as a keen athlete: "Why, that's a running track!"



Thomas Heberer and his wife, Wang Ying ... that's where they were. (Photo: Rosemarie Rospek)

It was partly coincidence, partly exercising his grey cells a little, he says.

He associated the shape with the start of a long-distance event in which the field quickly strings out, from a mass start to a handful of runners in the lead.

So the triangles were long-distance running tracks in the desert, and the curves that emerged from the apex of the triangle were vestiges of a slalom event that followed.

And why couldn't the competitors have run a lap of honour, or the final ceremony have been held, round the animal outlines?

Is the idea so fanciful it must be dismissed as the hallucination of an adventurer who feels the world has grown too boring and has been captivated by the fascination of South America?

Breunig sought confirmation of his theory. In the Museum of Anthropology in Lima he found runners portrayed on earthenware pots and other ceramic items.

He started poring over books and learnt that runners relaying messages played an important part in the powerful Inca empire.

Convinced he was on to the right idea, he set out to check the sites at ground-level. There was clearly no point in digging for shoestrings or looking for tracks or footprints, he realised.

They would long since have disappeared, but what he had in mind needed not have fallen foul of erosion and, miraculously, it had not.

If his theory was right, tracks ought to show signs of asymmetrical wear and tear on the bends. He set to work with a ruler and string.

"The work took two or three hours," he recalls. He found not only the traces he was looking for but others too, definite proof, as he sees it.

There were stone pillars on the inside circumference of the bends. They marked the edge of the track, he says. There were piles of stones along the base-line of the triangles. They were the starting blocks, he says.

Last year, as an Olympic year, was a convenient time to publish his theory, but American and German scientific journals would have nothing to do with it.

Then his article was carried by *Interciencia,* a Venezuelan magazine. It was headlined "Nazca, a pre-Columbian Olympic site?"

A number of experts have since told him his idea was interesting enough to merit further research. Breunig has put together 23 arguments in support of his theory.

"Even if you are sceptical," he says with an air of conviction, "you must admit there are more points for me than against me."

He feels it makes perfect sense to clear dark stones from the desert soil to mark out geographical patterns in the lighter-coloured sand when you run round them barefoot.

Zig-zag lines, he says, often begin on a left-hand bend. Why should this not suggest the idea of races, given that most people are right-handed, right-footed and naturally prefer left-hand bends?

It is certainly amazing what conclusions the Munich patent lawyer who finds the world boring has reached by, as he puts it, exercising his grey cells a little.

Sabine Reuter

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 December 1981)

A crop of fair hair captures Yi imagination

The last foreigner before Thomas Heberer to visit the Yi country in the mountains of south China and live to tell the tale was Marco Polo in the 13th century.

Two British officers ventured into the area at the end of the 19th century. Nothing was ever heard of them again.

Thomas Heberer is a 34-year-old Sinologist whose two months with the Yi are described in a book he has published with financial backing from the Scientific Research Association.

No-one makes an exhibition like the one he undertook last summer without thorough preparation. His preparations began at a very early age.

He was fascinated by the Far East as a child and went on to study anthropology and Sinology in Heidelberg and Frankfurt.

He learnt Chinese in Mainz before making his first journey to China in 1975. He was so impressed that he set his heart on living and working in China.

He succeeded in July 1977 when the Chinese embassy in Bonn arranged for him to work in Peking as a translator, editor and reader at the Foreign Language Publishing House.

In August 1979 he married Wang Ying, a Chinese girl, who has come with him now he is back in Germany on a visit.

She accompanied him on his visit to the Yi country. The Yi are a Chinese national minority who lived as slave-owners until the mid-50s.

"The Chinese then launched bids to democratise them," he says. "They were careful and patient, keen to avoid uprisings. The former chieftains were given government jobs and so enabled to maintain their living standards.

"Slavery has now been abolished. People still live in relative poverty, but they have benefited from improvements in infrastructure.

"Schools and medical services have been set up. Bonuses are paid to encourage agricultural reforms. Children are offered a fine boarding school education free of charge."

Dr Heberer is keenly interested in how China has set about solving the problems of its national minorities, about whom he has this to say:

Five to six per cent of the 1,000 million Chinese belong to 55 national minorities who between them populate 60 per cent of the country's surface area.

When he and his wife set out on their expedition, Szechwan province, which was where the Yi live, had just been devastated by floods.

His wife, incidentally, is a nurse who has specialised in traditional Chinese medicine and acupuncture.

The only way they could reach the Yi country, 3,500km south-west of Peking, was by air. The only rail link was flooded too over much of the distance.

The Yi were delighted with Heberer, whom they thought must be a very old man because his hair is fair.

"They kept telling me to let everyone abroad know all about them," he says. "I was particularly impressed by their extraordinary frankness and hospitality towards foreigners, both of which are typical of the Chinese as a whole."

(Bremer Nachrichten, 11 December 1981)

■ RESEARCH

Wanted: new warm water theory to replace Gulf Stream

Frankfurter Rundschau

The Gulf Stream is not exactly the central heating of northern Europe, as it for decades was reputed to be. But in a roundabout way it probably supplies much of the hot water for the central heating.

Heat is transported within gigantic vortices. German research vessels have identified one such vortex system near the mid-Atlantic ridge.

It is between 38 and 46 degrees West in an area roughly the same size as the Federal Republic of Germany but at a depth of between 2,000 and 3,000 metres.

The vortices swirl about 100 kilometres across. They have cold and hot water cores in which water from the Atlantic's warm water sphere circulates.

This warm water sphere contains fairly hot water down to substantial depths.

Kiel oceanologists who probed the area as part of the summer 1981 north-east Atlantic expedition reckon the water exchange between warm and cold vortices transports Gulf Stream water further north.

This vorticity transport theory could be the way heat is exchanged from the sub-tropical region of the Atlantic to its northern waters.

Scientists are on the lookout for a plausible theory because the Gulf Stream is now known not to do what was for so long felt to be its role.

A group of research scientists, mainly from Kiel University department of oceanology, have joined forces in a project financed by the Scientific Research Association.

The aim of their North Atlantic warm water sphere project is to find out how such large amounts of warm water find their way into the North Atlantic now the Gulf Stream is no longer felt to be the benefactor.

Recent research indicates that the Gulf Stream fails to scale the mid-Atlantic ridge, yet warm water does reach the coast of Europe.

Europe's western seaboard has a fairly mild climate as a result; so do the islands off its coast.

The research vessels *Meteor* and *Poseidon* sailed to the ridge area in the north-east Atlantic last summer to try and find out why and how.

Measurements of water temperature and current at various depths were taken over a wide area. Oceanographical measurement chains were strung out to plot water movement over a period of years.

Drift buoys were released and their progress will be covered by satellite as they show how surface water travels across the Atlantic.

Entirely new oceanographic measurement devices were tested. They included free-fall probes developed in the United States.

They are sunk from research vessels and record water temperature and current flow as they descend. They are not retrieved; they just sink to the seabed after use.

The entire project was devised because observations, mainly by US oceanologists, indicated that the Gulf Stream did not function as the central heating of Europe.

Until a few years ago it was felt to be a gigantic current spanning the entire Atlantic, with lines, marked on all charts, branching out into the North Sea and the Arctic.

The Gulf Stream was generally agreed to be a blessing to northern Europe, which owed to it its mild climate.

But detailed research has shown that it fails to scale the mid-Atlantic ridge. About half its warm water heads north and back into the north-west Atlantic.

More (but not much) flows via the southern Labrador Sea into the Arctic. What happens to the rest no-one knows.

Finding out how warm water is transported into the north-east Atlantic matters because water transport can give advance notice of short- and long-term climate changes.

It is surprising to learn that seabed obstacles such as the mid-Atlantic ridge, which is several thousand metres below the water surface, can influence currents at depths of as little as several hundred metres.

The German expedition returned home with some interesting observations in this connection.

A number of drift buoys were released in the Atlantic and their progress was followed by satellite. Instead of moving straight across seabed ridges miles below, they were influenced by them.

One drifter, for instance, went at least three times round the Altair crest in the mid-Atlantic, which rises from a depth of 4,500 to about 2,800 metres below the surface and is only about 50 square kilometres in extent.

But in the final analysis all the buoys drifted eastwards across the Atlantic, which means that even if there is not a fast-flowing Gulf Stream traversing the ocean, warm surface water still makes the journey.

At greater depths the currents are altogether different. The two research vessels plotted them between the 38th and 46th parallels.

Mysterious vortices reveal some of their secrets

This was the area in which they discovered the mysterious vortices. The water that rotates in them does so at speeds of between one and two metres per second.

The movements of a number of drifters proved that it circulates too. Scientists are not yet sure whether the vortices themselves move at all, but over an observation period of about five weeks they remained remarkably stable.

So it remains to be seen whether the vortices move and contribute towards the water exchange. But water, and heat, is definitely exchanged between hot and cold vortices.

This process could hold the key to the transport of warm water across the mid-Atlantic ridge, Kiel oceanologists surmise. It would, as it were, be a continuation of the Gulf Stream by other means.

Harald Steinert

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 December 1981)

A commercial aspect to seabed tests

The Bremen-based research vessel *Sonne*, successor to the *Valdivia*, has set sail from Honolulu in the direction of Mexico.

Scientists on board plan to test a new system of topographical analysis of the seabed, an electronically-controlled fan-type sounding device.

It plots the seabed in strips, says Dr Dieter Strohm of the research pool that operates the ship.

These strips can be as wide as 70 per cent of the water's depth. The seabed of the Pacific at 5,000 metres can thus be covered to a width of 3.5km, or two miles.

Previously, little more than lines across the seabed could be charted and analysed.

The new process is likely to play an important part in seabed mining, especially the mining of manganese nodules from depths of 5,000 metres.

Deep-sea miners are unlikely to come into their own as a profession much before the beginning of next century, though.

This conclusion was reached at a five-week course in Hanover and Aachen held under the auspices of the International Ocean Institute, Malta, and attended by 12 government officials from 10 developing countries.

They dealt, along inter-disciplinary lines, with the legal and practical requirements of what promises to be a technology of the future.

As yet, manganese and phosphate nodules, heavy metal silt and other commodities can only be economically mined from the seabed on the continental shelf at depths of up to 200 metres.

So the miners are in the same boat as oil and gas prospectors, who have yet to work out how to get at their product through 3,000 to 5,000 metres of water.

"The Americans will probably be the first to mine manganese nodules off Hawaii in about 1985," says Elisabeth Mann-Borgese of Canada.

She is a specialist in the law of the sea and director of the UN-backed institute on Malta. Professor Mann-Borgese is a daughter of the German novelist Thomas Mann.

She hopes a new international authority will rule out disputes such as have beset fishery. But she would not bank on it.

She reckons the prospect of an international authority being set up to grant uniform mining licences and share the profits is at best an evens bet.

Venezuela, India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia are reportedly already preparing to mine seabed resources, in part independently of the multis.

In India especially, German development aid is being used to promote the process.

dpa

(Nordwest Zeitung, 15 December 1981)

The hot and the cold of a nuclear centre

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

Twenty-five years ago the North Rhine-Westphalian state assembly in Düsseldorf unanimously decided to set up a nuclear research facility.

No-one will then have seen how controversial the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy was to become.

But the Jülich nuclear research centre has now been going for a quarter of a century, during which it has set up two world records.

Jülich boasts the hottest reactor in the world. It has also reached the lowest temperature ever recorded, a few millionths of a degree above absolute zero.

The nuclear research tag prompts frequent criticism of Jülich, but its research scientists deal by no means only with controversial reactors.

About a third of their work is basic research, especially into solid-state physics, a sector in which large-scale research installations have proved their worth.

Jülich works in close harness with North Rhine-Westphalian universities including Cologne.

Twenty-seven of the 38 heads of department at Jülich are also on the staff of universities in Cologne, Bonn and Aachen.

The world's hottest reactor, a pebble-bed reactor, is still the boffins' favourite. More than 20 years of research have been ploughed into what is said to be the safest reactor design there is.

It generates electric power that is fed into the national grid, but Jülich's pebble-bed reactor is still an experimental facility. A commercial reactor has yet to be built to this design.

In Schmehausen in the Ruhr a high-temperature reactor has been under construction since 1969. But despite an investment of DM3bn it is still nowhere near completion.

The Schmehausen reactor is designed to supply heat for industrial processes. Research into the use of process heat is another major feature of research at Jülich.

Fusion research is yet another. A unit known as the Textor installation will, it is hoped, mark a major step in the technical implementation of the concept.

The Jülich story testifies to changes in research emphasis over the years. Last year, for instance, an environmental sample bank was set up.

Samples taken from our surroundings are preserved in a kind of deep freeze for future generations of scientists to probe and establish changes.

Mention was made at the silver jubilee ceremony of a new geophysical method of prospecting for oil. Developed at Jülich, it has proved so successful that several oil multis have bought it.

Wolf Häfele, the new directer and boss of a staff numbering more than 4,000 sees Jülich taking on entirely new roles that will have little in common with what it has done over the past 25 years.

Professor Häfele feels his 700-odd scientists are particularly confident they will meet the challenge of the future.

Horst Rademacher

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 11 December 1981)

■ THE CINEMA

Subtitles or dubbing? Both have advantages

OmU stands for *Originalfassung mit Untertiteln*, or original soundtrack with subtitles. It is an abbreviation cinemagoers will readily recognise.

Armchair viewers should recognise it too, especially if they regularly switch over to Channel 3 to watch the films on TV.

Films handled by commercial distributors in Germany, like TV films and serials, are invariably dubbed. So *OmU* is something special.

Many people make a point of not watching films with subtitles. Subtitles annoy them intensely. They want to watch a film, not read it, they say.

Fast American dialogue comedies of the 30s and 40s do not take kindly to subtitles. Their repartee is ruined if you constantly have to check the subtitles.

Besides, if the entire soundtrack were to be subtitled word for word, there would in some scenes be no time to watch the action.

The only viewer who really benefits from the original soundtrack with subtitles is the one who is reasonably fluent in the original language and needs only to check the subtitles from time to time.

At the cinema subtitles are nowhere near as annoying as they can be on TV because the cinema screen is so much larger. On the TV screen, subtitles take up far too much room.

If subtitles on TV are run well clear of the lower edge of the screen, and maybe against a distinct background to make reading them easier, woe betide the director who locates an important part of the visual action in the lower third of the screen! It will probably be obscured.

This recently happened to Renoir's *M. Lange's Crime* on the Third Programme of Hesse TV.

In 1936 Renoir could hardly be expected to bear in mind the exigencies of TV. Throughout a major section of dialogue he has the woman sit on a bench and converse with the man who is standing and looking down at her.

Her beautiful, expressive face is seen in close-up, but on TV it was mostly obscured by the two lines of subtitle.

To make matters worse, the subtitles did not exactly run at the same speed as the dialogue. Answers were flashed on the screen before they were spoken.

Viewers whose French was not good enough to follow the original soundtrack cannot be blamed for having wondered, at times in exasperation, who was saying what.

Matters were not made easier in the slightest by a dash being used to indicate a fresh speaker. Many viewers will have been none the wiser.

So Jean Renoir's French film classic was mauled in two ways. The subtitles ruined the picture and did not run concurrently with the spoken word.

At *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* in Cologne, where the subtitling was done, the process was defended staunchly.

Subtitles nowadays, WDR explained, run flush with the lower edge of the screen, but this film had been subtitled some years ago when TV screens could not always be adjusted exactly.

So the backroom boys had felt viewers must be helped by running the subtitles a little higher up the screen, and they were run across a grey slot to make them easier to read.

Subtitles, it was still felt, should all be of one length regardless how much was spoken. Viewers must be able to read them at ease.

Subtitles of varying lengths, flashed across the screen for varying periods of time, merely made the viewer nervous and distracted him from the picture.

He tended to concentrate on the subtitles for fear of missing an important item of dialogue.

That was why subtitles and the original soundtrack did not always run simultaneously. *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* readily admitted that this procedure was its own and not the general rule.

One can but hope so. It effectively reduces the dialogue reproduction to a summary of contents, with the two not necessarily running simultaneously.

It is only fair to say that TV companies usually spend much more time and effort on both subtitling and dubbing than companies that process foreign films for the cinema market.

The latter work on an entirely different financial basis and have to manage on a shoestring budget.

Kay Hecht of *Westdeutscher Rundfunk*, who is responsible for subtitles, is not keen on the idea of running subtitles at the top of the picture should the need arise.

Technically this would be no problem, but Hecht, who is a conscientious man, feels viewers would be nonplussed, having been accustomed to reading subtitles down below.

Besides, they would have to look first up, then down, to follow to words alone, let alone the action.

Robert Altman's *Nashville* was a recent exemple of how to do the job properly. It is a wide-screen film and was shown on TV, as usual, between slabs of black at the top and bottom of the screen.

Subtitles were inserted into the lower slab, not interfering with the picture at all. This is surely an ideal solution, although it may not always be possible.

But *Westdeutscher Rundfunk*, greatly to its credit, no longer handles wide-screen films. Despite the black slabs above and below, too much picture is lost to the left and the right.

Anyone who has seen, say, Andrzej Wajda's *Promised Land* both at the cinema and on TV will be bound to agree.

A screen event with its wide-angle landscapes, the film was optically emasculated on TV, testifying to much, but not to a great motion picture.

TV cannot, incidentally, satisfactorily reproduce even a standard format film that can be screened with virtually no cropping — not even in black and white.

Casablanca was a recent case in point. It is a film that needs to be shown in the cinema like those who watch it need air to breathe.

Dubbed in German, it simply does not do justice to the atmosphere of the original film.

Some film critics make a point of dismissing TV. This is a narrow-minded outlook; it is also grossly inappropriate.

Were it not for TV, the cinema would never have managed to regain something of its former status.

Television not only screens all over the country films that would otherwise be seen only in a handful of cities; it also helps to bankroll the cinema film (although this is not without its problems).

Subtitles are an attempt not only to cut costs but also to preserve as much of the original film as possible without making it inaccessible to viewers who are not conversant with the foreign language.

But the subtitles must not be allowed block the screen.

Helmut Schmitz

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 December 1981)

Film museum to be built in Frankfurt

Work will start on Frankfurt film museum in the New Year. It is scheduled to open in summer 1983. It will join film museums in Paris, Prague and Turin and, eventually, London.

The Frankfurt museum will be run by Walter Schobert, currently manager of the *Kommunales Kino*, which has been going for 10 years and was the first municipal cinema in the country.

It was the brainchild of Hilmar Hoffman, Frankfurt's city official in charge of the arts.

The film museum will be launched with material from Paul Sauerländer's film collection. Sauerländer founded the *Archiv für Filmkunde* and his collections are already owned by the city.

The new building will also house the *Deutsches Institut für Filmkunde*, currently in Wiesbaden, and a new, smaller *Kommunales Kino* seating 120.

The institute will temporarily be housed in a Frankfurt office block.

The museum will have an annual allowance of DM650,000 with which to buy films and material, but DM100,000 a year will initially go towards purchasing the Sauerländer collection.

Sauerländer's first collection was bought by Frankfurt on an annuity basis. The second was bought from his heirs (he died in 1980) but the price has yet to be paid.

The riverside building that is to house the museum will first be demolished inside, as it were, leaving the facade intact. Then a new purpose-built structure will be built inside the shell.

Frankfurt city council has allocated DM16.4m towards the cost of construction. The museum will make Frankfurt a European film centre, says Herr Hoffmann. The municipal and university library has a collection of 30,000 books on the subject and subscribes to 260 film magazines.

The Wiesbaden institute will add to this stock its collection of 50,000 books on the film industry.

The museum will have 2,830 square metres (34,000 square feet) of exhibition space. Its latest acquisition is a camera made by Oskar Messter, a cinematographic pioneer. It is serial-numbered 10.

Its stock incudes optical toys such as the so-called wonder drum, film literature, antediluvian cameras such as the 17th century magic lantern and other precursors of modern equipment.

Exhibits will include the first-ever German camera, dating back to 1872, the oldest projectors and about 2,500 film copies.

Irmgard Ganssaüge

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 December 1981)



The reluctant star . . . Hanna Schygulla in the title role of Effi Briest.

(Photo: Filmverlag der Autoren)

New dimension to Hanna's star appeal

Hanna Schygulla, generally considered to be the first lady of the cinema in Germany, is becoming an international star at last.

Her latest film is a Franco-Italian production, *A New World*. And her next will be directed by Jean-Luc Godard.

Schygulla's performances in Fassbinder's *Lilli Marleen* and *The Marriage of Maria Braun* established her position as the top actress in Germany.

Maria Braun also established her reputation internationally.

But she has been sceptical about international offers. Hollywood was unable to tempt her with the title role in *Sophie's Choice*, which went to Meryl Streep (of *Holocaust* and *Kramer v. Kramer*).

Fassbinder now prefers Barbara Sukowa, of *Lola*, and Rosel Zech, of *The Secret of Veronika F.*

"I am no longer going to ask her to play a part that will get her no further personally," says director Fassbinder, with whom Schygulla worked for so many years.

She starred in Volker Schlöndorff's *The Forgery*, but the critics were not uniformly enthusiastic. Her latest film, *A New World* is directed by Ettore Scola of Italy.

Schygulla, playing an 18th century Paris courtesan, stars alongside Vittorio Gassman, Andrea Ferreol and Marcello Mastroianni.

It is a costume film set in the days of the French Revolution which gave her an opportunity of playing a part entirely different from what she was used to.

Hanna Schygulla once dreamed of becoming an international star in a German film and came within a hair's breadth of her ambition in Fassbinder's screen version of Fontane's novel *Effi Briest*.

But then she left Fassbinder and the film business, hitch-hiked across the States and retired to the seclusion of a Bavarian farmhouse.

She was reluctant to become a public figure, yet she is gradually becoming one after all.

In Jean-Luc Godard's film, she is to star alongside Isabelle Huppert, but all that is known about the film is a statement by Godard:

"I can see Hanna Schygulla's red-gold locks softly reflected by the setting sun in the evening wind. I am fascinated by the picture. We will find a story to fit it."

Bernd Lubowski

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 11 December 1981)

■ FORUM

East Berlin setting for writers' peace debate



Talking in East Berlin: from left, Stephan Hermlin (GDR), Bernt Engelmann and Brigitte Drewitz (both Federal Republic of Germany). (Photo: dpa)

Some 100 writers, artists and scholars met in the ballroom of an East Berlin hotel to discuss ways of promoting peace.

Most were from the two German states, but there was a sprinkling of Austrians, Swiss, Danes and Britons. Benito Wogatzki, a GDR TV script writer said the meeting was an acid test as to whether or not writers from East and West could still talk with each other.

"All I can say now... it works!" he said.

Three months ago, when the first invitations went out, there was hardly anyone who believed that the meeting, initiated by the GDR writer Stephan Hermlin, would take place.

Naturally, Hermlin had the blessing of the GDR party brass, but this is not always enough in East Germany.

When the meeting was opened, a relieved Hermlin said: "Sometimes it's possible to do things other people consider impossible because they're not prepared to try."

The conference, known as "Berlin Meeting for the Promotion of Peace", was held under extremely favourable conditions immediately after the Honecker-Schmidt meeting.

It was held on a day when the party organ *Neues Deutschland* carried the banner headline: "Erich Honecker: Europe needs no Euro-Schism".

Unfortunately, the meeting was overshadowed by the events in Poland.

It was never intended to pass resolutions and issue communiqués. What mattered was only what the assembled intellectuals had to say to each other, and they spoke with remarkable frankness.

Few of the tricky issues concerning GDR society were swept under the carpet in fact, the ears of the SED brass in the nearby Central Committee building must have been ringing.

There was enough said that was thought-provoking for Western politicians as well — especially the West Germans. They would be well advised to look at the minutes of the meeting.

Organiser Hermlin himself touched upon the first taboo when quoting a pacifist Lenin statement in a society that is officially governed by the maxim "peace must be armed", calling for unilateral disarmament.

And his call to "make peace without weapons", which was in essence utopian and therefore "had a core of reality", had previously, at best been heard in Protestant circles of the GDR.

Stefan Heym, whose publication in the West of his novel *Collin* had earned him a 10,000-mark fine in the GDR and expulsion (along with others) from the Writers' Association, questioned apparently eternal GDR textbook truths: "There is no such thing as a just war today. It doesn't exist and it cannot exist because there are no just atom bombs. The SS-20 is as unjust as the Pershing II."

Heym suggested that people who plan such weapons be castigated as criminals.

"Neither of the two German states plans a war. But there is a danger that a war will be fought on German territory," said Heym.

Rolf Schneider, who was expelled from the Writers' Association together with Heym, drew attention to the peace appeal of European writers which was initiated by Bernt Engelmann of Munich and signed by many GDR authors.

But the GDR newspapers, he said, never mentioned some of the signatories — those who were expelled from the Writers' Association.

Said Schneider: "Those publicists who censored these names out of the GDR press evidently considered the literary disputes of 1979 more important than peace. This is more than a disgrace."

Schneider stressed that it is a very short road from an armed border skirmish to a nuclear holocaust.

He therefore asked himself and other GDR writers "whether we can still permit children who can imagine neither death nor killing with atom weapons to play with guns and tanks — both those in their rooms and those they are shown on excursions to manoeuvre sites."

He also questioned "the wisdom of East Germany's civil defence which acts as if a bit of asbestos in front of the belly and the right position on the ground makes for survival in a nuclear attack."

There was no audience, except for the press.

This is a rarity in seminar type meetings — not only in the East but in the West as well.

In any event, the Chancellor's visit to Güstrow immediately before the East Berlin meeting showed the GDR's mastery in picking the right spectators.

The journalists at the meething were reluctant to leave the ball to rush to the telephones and call their editorial offices.

Since speaking time was restricted to five minutes and every participant was permitted to interject (up to three minutes), important new statements were likely to crop up while they were out of the hall.

GDR playwright Heiner Müller said: "When talking about the same weapons we talk both about the same and about different things. Armament in the capitalist world creates and preserves jobs.

"The opposite still remains to be proved. But armament in our world reduces the standard of living, which is borne out in our everyday lives."

He went on to say: "The tragedy of the Children's Crusade repeats itself in the Peace Movement. Behind the question 'war or peace?' is the nuclear threat and the even more frightening question whether there is such a thing as a peace other than the peace of exploitation and corruption. The end of humanity as the price to be paid for the survival of the planet."

Franz Fühmann, GDR, said: "It is a tragic paradox that humanity is in a position to destroy itself before it has formed itself: self-destruction as a constituent act... The universal character of the Peace Movement of the 1980s which transcends national, religious, state and ideological boundaries, contains the kernel of a world domestic policy from the grassroots: the breaking up of the vicious circle in which mistrust and arms buildup create more mistrust... To declare war on lies is the essential thing. It is what writers can contribute towards peace."

Christa Wolf, GDR, said that if it's planned for Europe to go under within three years we can risk a thing or two in the time that remains.

She asked whether writers, artists and scholars should not start to think and do "what actually cannot be done... E.g. this meeting which, though it should not be possible, is taking place."

Hermann Kant, president of the GDR Writers' Association, told the meeting: "We must operate on the assumption that others could consider themselves threatened by us. My knowing that this is not so does not help us out of the dilemma. I must convince those concerned — and everybody is concerned — that I am interested in peace."

Since he wanted to go on living for a while, he said, he would follow anybody who called on him to keep out of it, only "he told me where I could go."

In some of those in authority, he detected a "nervousness about the public ing — and this applies to those in authority in the West as it does to those in the East."

Despite the fact that many issues were touched upon only perfunctorily and much remained unclarified, and despite the fact that in their attempt at thinking many speakers fell back on old and very old positions, and though the Polish events overshadowed the meeting (Stefan Heym: "Is the fuse burning a few kilometres away while we talk about peace?"), the GDR can take credit for having made this meeting possible.

Hermlin said in his closing address: "For me it is a dream come true — a dream which occupied me in the past few months and from which I don't want to wake up: I wish that now we have started we will continue."

Let's hope so.

Karl-Heinz Baum

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 December 1981)

Historian warns of Germany's 'divided culture'

In the GDR history is the sword. In the Federal Republic it is part of the culture pages of newspapers, a speaker told a meeting in Munich of the Catholic Academy in Bavaria.

Michael Stürmer, an Erlangen historian, said the Federal Republic of Germany was "half a nation that has opted out of the totality of German history".

East Berlin, on the other hand, was reluctant to give up its claims to intellectual leadership.

The meeting dealt primarily with the GDR's attempts to strengthen the country's national consciousness by laying claim to eras and personalities of German history. Prussia, Goethe and Luther are cases in point.

The theme was "Divided Germany — Divided Culture?"

It soon became clear that the Federal Republic has accepted the GDR's search for a national identity as a provocation rather than an opportunity.

Usurpation and isolation were the most frequently-used words in describing the GDR's changed attitude towards the common German history.

"The crux in the debate on German history was the issue of nationhood," said Stürmer.

His opposite numbers in East Germany's Communist Party, he said, had become national-liberal so to speak, accepting Bismarck and Prussia.

There is nothing but progressive heritage in sight. It includes Thomas Münzer and Goethe, Scharnhorst and the *Rote Kapelle*.

Dealing with history is no private pastime in the GDR. "There, history is the sword; with us it is part of the culture pages of newspapers," criticised Stürmer.

Since 1976/77, GDR history has been viewed as the essence of German history in which the Federal Republic of Germany is but an episode.

All participants were aware of this intellectual-national challenge.

The question is: are there also two German literatures; is Goethe read differently in East Germany than in West Germany?

PEN general secretary Martin Gregor-Dellin saw the division of German literature primarily in the fact that "its larger part is non-existent in the GDR."

At some point, he said, the idea of two German literatures will have to be abandoned. The literature of an era is linked like water in the pipes of the *Zeitgeist*.

It is true that a West German youngster finds it easier to understand a novel about a working-class family than Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain*. But the real danger lies in the loss of tradition and memory.

At first, the GDR proclaimed an ahistoric approach in the wake of which the Berlin *Schloss* was razed and the monuments to Kaisers Wilhelm and

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■ CHILDREN

Doctor accuses state of exploitation, hostility

German society is hostile towards children. It is a hostility that will cost society dearly.

This is the opinion of Professor Hans Ewerbeck, medical director of Cologne's Municipal Children's Hospital.

He told the 10th German Congress of Perinatal Medicine in Berlin that:

- Families with children were exploited by the state.
- Modern sociology made parents so insecure about child rearing that many were not capable of bringing up their children.
- The striving for self-realisation by adults poisoned the atmosphere in which children had to grow up.

Families with children were at a disadvantage everywhere: in housing, while travelling or when mothers tried to find employment.

By contrast, prospects for a childless couple were rosy. They were two consumers, but usually had two incomes and, eventually, two pensions.

A couple with one child meant three mouths to feed, usually on one income. And there was only one pension on the horizon.

So economic considerations prompted women with children to take a job when they should be at home.

Delegates discussed ways and means of "countering the disastrous developments in our family affairs, educational and youth policies and thus stop our society from sliding into catastrophe."

Statistics show that the disinclination of Germans to have children will lead to a situation by the year 2010 where the working population will no longer be able to earn enough money to ensure the pensions of their parents.

Professor Ewerbeck said the fact that the financial burdens imposed by children are the driving force behind making mothers go to work is also substantiated by polls that show that one in three women considers three or more children desirable.

Yet as soon as the first child has arrived, only one in ten wants three or more children.

Since every child reduces a family's standard of living (a family with four children enjoys only half the standard of living of a childless couple) it is not surprising that many couples prefer not to have any children.

More than half of Germany's couples are childless; and the 620,000 births in 1980 are contrasted by 740,000 deaths in the same period.

Professor Ewerbeck stressed that the economic burden on families with children are matched by those resulting from what he called the "psychologisation" of the educational system.

"A great many people today believe that it is easier to create optimal educational conditions without the family and that the world can be put in order by making educationalists learn complicated teaching techniques.

"The truth is that this approach to education is the reason why too many of our children are nervous, aggressive and incapable of emotional attachments to people or things."

This type of rationalised education "without heart or commonsense" is as hostile to children as the self-realisation drive of adults to whom children are irksome obstacles.

"Our children thus grow up in a world of adults concerned only with themselves. They permit a housing policy geared entirely to adults and providing not even minimal scope for children. It is adults who permit a traffic system that has made us world champions in accidents involving children — 70,000 a year."

Since juveniles have to grow up in such a world of atrophied feelings and hostility to children it is not surprising that they are insecure, resigned and frightened and no longer willing or capable to tackle the tasks of the future. The results are protest and opting out of society. It is up to the adults rather than the young to act.

It is possible, Professor Ewerbeck said, that the mass media with their medical reports help to aggravate the hostility towards children by putting off even the few people who still would like to have children.

A panel discussion on "information and the imparting of insecurity among pregnant women by the mass media" proved explosive.

Zurich gynaecologist Professor Bretscher turned against his own profession when, referring to the media's constant presentation of conflicting medical views, he said that the press should be protected from wrong information which doctors disseminate all the time.

Professor Erich Saling conducted polls among more than 200 pregnant women to establish the justification of this criticism levelled against the media.

The results: the true mass media — TV, radio, dailies and magazines — play a relatively unimportant role in providing pregnant women with information on pregnancy and birth compared with the role played by the gynaecologist.

He concluded that the role of the mass media in making women insecure should not be overestimated.

But he also said that the media play a major role inasmuch as more than half the women interviewed showed an interest in discussions on changes and improvements in obstetrics.

But there are shortcomings in our information campaigns — evidenced by the fact that close to 25 per cent of the women interviewed considered modern examination methods using ultrasonic techniques dangerous although there is no scientific evidence to substantiate this.

Dieter Dietrich

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 12 December 1981)

'Divided culture'

Continued from page 12

Frederick the Great were destroyed or hidden.

But then it proceeded to claim the "progressive", humanistic and socialist forces for itself.

West Berlin museum director Professor Peter Bloch saw the exploitation of Prussian history as a stone in the edifice of a new GDR national consciousness.

Frederick the Great, for instance, was re-erected this year. So was Freiherr vom Stein. As Bloch sees it, this is one more reason for us to take our history seriously and oppose the GDR's claims.

The Bonn music theoretician Günther Massenkeil used Beethoven and Händel as examples.

According to the theologian Gottfried Maron, the GDR has changed its attitude towards Luther whose anniversary is to be celebrated in 1983 and fully exploited in terms of domestic and foreign policy.

Honecker himself, he said had once called Luther a "lackey" and "traitor to the peasantry". Now, he speaks of him as one of the "greatest sons" of the German people.

Today, Luther is seen as a representative of his class who could not have acted in any other way. Though a bourgeois scholar, he was a "convincing representative of an early bourgeois revolution.' According to the GDR's present interpretation of history, the function of the Reformation was to break the hold of feudal ideology.

Like the others, Maron sees the new GDR culture strategy as a provocation to the West.

Hanns-Jochen Kaffsack

(Nordwest Zeitung, 14 December 1981)

'Instant tea' keeps them quiet and ruins their teeth

For mothers it is the easy way out; and the children like it. As soon as they become restless and grouchy, the mother reaches for the plastic bottle complete with teat and peace is restored instantly.

The advertisements for "instant children's tea" (94 to 96 per cent sugar) claim that this will ensure parents an "undisturbed night's sleep", praising the "beneficial effects" of the concoction.

Professor Wetzel of the Institute for Child Dentistry at Giessen University now warns mothers against giving in to temptation and pacifying their children with the instant tea.

A two-year study clearly shows that almost all children who have been pacified with the instand tea developed irreparable caries of their upper incisors.

Since the plastic bottles, which many manufacturers supply free of charge, are unbreakable the children can suck the excessively sweet drink throughout the day without supervision.

The results are summed up as follows:

- The sugar leads to caries within a very short time. The destroyed incisors must frequently be extracted before the child is two years old. As a result of the gap the jaw becomes malformed and the remaining and upcoming teeth grow crookedly, necessitating braces.
- When it comes to the transition from soft to solid foods, the child cannot learn how to chew because it lacks the necessary teeth.
- The development of speech is hampered because the child is unable to form sibilants.

Instant teas, which come in a wide variety of flavours, are not the only culprits. Soft drinks also contain large amounts of sugar and so promote caries.

Parents should therefore insist that their children brush their teeth every time they have had such a drink or that they at least rinse their mouths.

Since caries among children is extremely widespread — the average four-year-old has three to four decaying teeth — dentists recommend early checkups.

This is the only way children will lose their fear of the dentist. Some 60 per cent of our children are afraid of drilling and injections.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 12 December 1981)

School plan for handicapped

A school in Schenefeld, a Hamburg suburb in Schleswig-Holstein, is conducting an experiment in which handicapped children learn in the same class as normal children.

In Germany, it is common for children who are handicapped to attend special schools.

Although this project has the backing of the *Land* government, it regards the experiment as an isolated one and will not ask the Federal government in Bonn to accept it as a pilot scheme.

The project involves four handicapped children and 11 others in elementary school.

The fact that an information meeting was crowded to the last place recently despite the winter weather shows the great interest in the experiment among parents of both handicapped and non-handicapped children.

"We believe that our Eva who, like other children, was brought up in kindergarten and family would become truly handicapped if she were sent to a special school," says Sonja Schmidt, whose daughter walks on crutches, adding: "Today we know that Eva is happy in her classroom and that she feels absolutely equal."

The children quite naturally exchange experiences, as for instance when playing the "disabled child game" or a game they themselves invented and called the "crutch game".

While playing, they learn to be considerate towards each other without the usual feeling of pity towards the handicapped.

Another parent: "Naturally, we've asked ourselves time and again whether the handicapped children will act as a drag when it comes to learning. We've also asked ourselves whether the psychological burden would overwhelm our child and whether the handicapped would not be better off in a special school. But all of us parents now know that it's better this way."

Paediatrician Professor Rainer Höhne, who supports the Schenefeld experiment and acts as an adviser, says that some of the misery to which handicapped children are exposed through isolation must be blamed on the medical profession.

Due to improved diagnostic methods, more and more disabilities are being uncovered.

"And the more special schools we have the more disabled children we come up with and the more children are taken out of normal school and put into special schools," says Professor Höhne.

The Schenefeld experiment is largely due to the initiative of the *Verein Lebenshilfe für Behinderte* (a society for the promotion of a better life for the disabled) which gathered the necessary information at the Montessori Kindergarten in Munich and the Fläming School in Berlin.


In October 1980, three couples with two handicapped children and one non-handicapped child got together with the aim of establishing an integrated elementary school class in Schenefeld.

Their plan was approved by the town councillors of all three parties, who decided to support the experiment.

They allocated the money for a specialised auxilliary teacher and obtained the necessary approval from the Schleswig-Holstein government which has been paying the extra teacher's salary since August.

dpa

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 December 1981)



■ SOCIETY

Disabled hold 'trial' which condemns businessmen, institutions, doctors

The last days of the International Year of the Disabled were marked by the "Cripples' Tribunal" in Dortmund where 400 handicapped people charged society with abuse, discrimination and inhumanity.

The "Cripples' Tribunal" has put various public sectors in the dock, among them:

- Institutions and charitable organisations "for perpetuating and obfuscating" the conditions in them;
- Social welfare authorities for "arbitrariness";
- Businessmen for "enriching themselves by exploiting the disabled in special workshops under the cloak of kindness";
- The lawmakers who are responsible for the "inhuman rate of pay in workshops for the disabled";
- Funding agencies for having made the legal jungle even more impenetrable;
- Doctors for treating the disabled as second-class citizens; and
- The media for "serving VIPs and politicians in their bid for self-glorification and promoting their image as benefactors."

The cases presented by disabled people, orderlies and social workers were shattering — shattering because they occurred in a country that calls itself civilised.

The story of Peter, one of the 400, is typical: "I was three when I was put into an institution. Today I know that it was a mental home for children. I was tied down with ropes, given jabs and beaten."

Peter 19, a spastic from Munich, relates the story of a person whose ghetto career began in childhood because the medical profession was unable to come up with a correct diagnosis; or perhaps because his parents lacked the necessary stamina in fighting bureaucracy or because of a series of unfortunate coincidences.

What happened to him was unfortunate, but it was no coincidence. Institutions are still the ultimate fate of many disabled people for whom there is no school nearby and who can find no apprenticeship in their home town.

The insitution becomes both melting pot and terminus... perhaps because the spirit of the 1920 Prussian law governing the disabled is still alive: "The cripple belongs in an institution."

In Peter's case, the institution was a mental home. After nine years, he was put in another home and for four years attended a special school. All he remembers of that time is that he was frequently "kicked in the belly."

Two more institutions followed before, as a young man, he wound up in an old people's home.

When he complained about the constant tutelage and a life governed by regulations he considered humiliating, he was threatened with being made a ward of court.

This prompted him to get on a train in a bid for freedom.

Today, Peter, who is tied to a wheelchair, has his own apartment and is trying to recover from the harm that was done to him in various institutions. Friedns are lending a helping hand.

There is hardly any area of day-to-day without barriers for the disabled. In

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

fact, it is these barriers — frequently arbitrarily and brutally erected — that turn them into disabled persons.

A woman suffering from muscular dystrophy spoke of "violation of human rights", citing a gynaecologist who asked her what she wanted the Pill for.

Another woman who reported to the police that she had been raped was told: "It must be wishful thinking rather than reality."

A Munich lawyer told the tribunal of children who had been gagged with surgical tape by the orderlies and of others who were allocated specific times for going to the toilet and who, as a consequence, soiled themselves and were then forbidden to take a bath.

He also quoted an institution director who had been threatened with criminal charges because he refused to permit the children to play outdoors as having said: "The inmate material will get fixed times allocated for exercise."

The lawyer told the tribunal about four disabled persons who had to go to court to exercise their rights to apartments of their own.

The situation is most disastrous in psychiatric clinics and scandals that come to light are only the tip of an iceberg. The relevant organisations speak of "beatings, manslaughter, larceny, embezzlement, unlawful locking up and drug abuse in mental homes."

One of the participants in the tribunal who had shaved his head ("out of protest because they made me a ward of court") and who wore a shield around his neck ("if they put me into a mental home again I'll go on hunger strike") tellingly described the vicious circle in this kind of institution:

"We have nothing to occupy ourselves with and are not even allowed to read. So all you can do is walk around the place — up and down. There isn't much room. And then they come and interpret this as "conspicuous restlessness'."

Rolf Baader of the Self-Help Society for the Disabled told the meeting that the "examination methods for people who have committed sex crimes are particularly humiliating. The prisoners have electrodes attached to the penis and are then shown pornographic films. The reaction is to provide information on the sex drive."

Before the disabled were allowed to start their tribunal in the very place where the Year of the Disabled officially began, they had to overcome some unexpected obstacles.

The city of Dortmund (which subsidised the opening ceremony that ushered in the Year of the Disabled the tune of DM500,000, playing host to scores of politicians) initially refused to provide suitable premises for the tribunal.

It appears that the city fathers were still upset at the protest demonstration before the opening ceremony when a group of disabled people defied the ushers and went into the hall.

They complained that the assembled politicians were talking about them instead of with them, eventually managing to get on to the stage and forcing President Carstens to vacate it.

In the end, the tribunal was held in a Protestant church without politicians, without government officials, without the major societies for the handicapped and without contributions from charitable organisations.

Said Theresia Degener in her opening address: "As opposed to the established organisations for the handicapped and UN observation of the International Year of the Disabled, which work hand in hand with the ghetto policies of welfare authorities our fundamental principle is that the handicapped must speak for themselves."

This is the more important, the critical disabled say, since it is exactly this that they are denied in a reality that is marked by tutelage and ghettoisation.

The UN Year, they say, served only the purpose of putting a smokescreen around realities by stressing the charitable character of the Year. The disabled demand rights instead of pity and solidarity instead of "a heart".

Frau Degener denied that the group that invaded the Westphalia Hall was a "radical minority", saying: "We disabled people are never given an opportunity to say something about the conditions in which they live. They are isolated, locked up and are not permitted to as much as develop needs of their own."

Petra, who has been in an institution for 15 years ("because my mother is poor") is a case in point.

"We're made to get up at 6 a.m. and by 9 p.m. we must be in bed."

She shares a dormitory with 14 others — 15 women aged between 16 and 76.

Said another woman who has tried to kill herself: "I have been asking for years that the nursing staff knock on the door before entering. To no avail. A cleaning woman told me: "I thought this was an institution'."

Even where conditions are reasonably "tolerable" there is "total care to the point where I lose all desire to have a wil of my own."

The mistrust of the disabled is justified. Whenever they rise against pity, alms and hypocritical solidarity appeals the non-handicapped donors go on the offensive.

This was so at the opening ceremony for the UN Year in Dortmund, it was so at the Rehabilitation Fair in Düsseldorf and at many other events during the Year of the Disabled.

It was so whenever the disabled mounted protest demonstrations (as aginst the Frankfurt court ruling in connection with a spoiled vacation) or when they went on hunger strike against the discontinuation of transport facilities for the handicapped. It applied every time when they had to fight for rights that the non-handicapped take for granted.

The mistrust is fuelled still further by the cutbacks in the social welfare sector.

Kurt Jacobls, professor of vocational teaching for the disabled, said "it is the height of cynicism; these cutbacks are tantamount to an impoverishment of the disabled ordered by the state."

Heinz Welz

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 17 December 1981)

Handicapped 'are being helped'

Consistent, unspectacular work in social institutions is the way to improve the lot of the disabled, says North Rhine-Westphalia's Social Affairs Minister Friedhelm Farthmann.

Speaking as the United Nations Year of the Disabled came to its final days, he said aggressive action such as the "cripples tribunal" in Dortmund was less likely to help.

He conceded that there was room for improvement in the approach of government agencies.

But the "cynical and inhuman" language used at the Cripples' Tribunal, he said, besmirched the hard work done by many institutions.

In his balance sheet of the International Year of Disabled Persons, Farthmann called the organisers of the Dortmund Tribunal "ideologues who would otherwise be unable to make themselves heard politically."

He warned the disabled against allowing themselves to be abused by such ideologues.

The UN Year was a success. Only those who expected patent remedies were disappointed.

Though fully understanding the impatience of the disabled, their next-of-kin and their friends and their disappointment over gaps and omissions in integrating them into society as equals, Farthmann said that, compared with previous decades, 1981 has resulted in a breakthrough.

He listed several innovations aimed at making the life of the handicapped easier.

On the negative side, he said, was the rapidly rising number of severely disabled unemployed.

In North Rhine-Westphalia alone there 40,623 severely handicapped people out of work as at the end of November — an increase against the previous year by 10,626 (35.4 per cent).

Said Farthmann: "This is a bitter pill to swallow."

It was particularly so for the Ministry because North Rhine-Westphalia's ministries were among those that failed to reach the six per cent employment target for the disabled.

Only 5.5 per cent of those employed by the state are disabled, he said.

Farthmann attributed the failure to reach the target to the high quota of state employees in the Ministries of Education and the Interior, which account for two-thirds of all personnel on the state payroll; and it is almost impossible to employ the handicapped as teachers and police officers.

Though he would like to see the penalty for falling short of target raised from the present DM100 to DM200 a month, this is impossible because it would severely deplete the already empty state coffers.

Yet it would be desirable to double the penalty and so exert pressure on employers.

The DM100 penalty introduced in 1974 is worth less than half now, due to inflation.

Reinhard Voss

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 December 1981)

■ OUR WORLD

Battered wives 'not an isolated problem'

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Battered wives seldom get enough help or advice, says a report published by Hamburg's sexual equality commissioner, Eva Rühmkorf.

The use of force on women is not a marginal problem. It occurs frequently and in all age groups, career groups and social strata.

The report does not, as has often been the case, rely on women's testimony. It also consults people not directly concerned, such as the police, public prosecutors, social workers and lawyers.

It does not claim to be representative, merely to shed light, as a pilot project, on a social black spot and fact of life.

Family fisticuffs are particularly frequent at weekends and on holidays, such as Christmas. The sparks usually fly in the evening or at night.

As a rule the police are then the only institution that can be called in to help. Social workers are no longer available on the phone.

If battered wives try the next day to arrive at other than short-term, stop-gap solutions, they usually find that:

"Nearly all institutions and people who give advice are inclined towards short-term solutions on the assumption *that difficul*ties might, hopefully, be quickly be dealt with once and for all."

Or so the authors of the report, psy*chologis*ts both (and women), say. They claim that doctors' consultations tend to take less than 10 minutes, while police calls to deal with family quarrels take 15 to 20 minutes.

As for the legal profession, lawyers only find time for a longer consultation in connection with divorce proceedings.

The social services seldom find time to provide intensive advice either, the report says. They have far too much else to do.

Yet for most women who had problems with husbands or men-friends the changing circumstances were a long-term process, with many discouraging developments and fresh starts.

This being so, particular importance must be attached to the projects launched and sponsored by the women's movement, such as refuges for battered wives and an emergency phone number for women who had been raped.

The report evaluated all the Hamburg police calls to handle family disputes in October and November 1980. There were 840 in all.

In 412 cases charges were preferred for grievous bodily harm and trespassing in connection with the use of force, insults and threatening behaviour with firearms.

Nearly all the 412 men had steady relationships with the woman in question: 155 were husbands, 71 good friends, 59 men-friends and fiances, 43 ex-husbands, 20 ex-friends or fiances and 11 sons.

Most divorce court judges questioned said that wife-battering was mentioned in about 10 per cent of divorce proceedings. That would mean that in 1979 about 500 divorces were granted in Hamburg alone to battered wives.

Emergency phones manned by social workers totalled an annual 550 calls triggered by family disputes, threats and violence.

An October 1980 Infas poll revealed that 50 per cent of Hamburg men and women felt battered wives stood the best chance of help in a refuge.

Other facilities mentioned were Pro Familia (31 per cent), the police (28 per cent), the family welfare department (25 per cent), other citizen's adivce centres (23 per cent), women's groups (18 per cent) and doctors, lawyers and clergymen (14 per cent each).

The total comes to over 100 per cent because more than once choice was allowed.

The report suggests setting up more advice centres and improving coordination among those that already exist.

Thomas Wolgast

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 17 December 1981)

Fine judgment

The judge, not the man in the dock, paid the fine imposed by the court for a practical joke in Paderborn, Westphalia.

A 55-year-old unemployed man was taken to court for stealing a Bundeswehr uniform while under the influence of alcohol and dressing up a fellow-drinker in it.

The judge fined him DM10, but as he had not a cent to his name the judge decided to be even more charitable and lent him the money out of his own pocket.

dpa

(Kieler Nachrichten, 18 December 1981)

Jail or social work: choice for those who can't pay up

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

Convicted debtors in Hesse can, as an experiment, choose between serving a prison sentence or doing social work.

The scheme has been run for three months in Hanau and Kassel and is supervised by Dr Zimmermann of the Hesse Justice Ministry in Wiesbaden.

His department deals with alternatives to conventional penal sanctions.

If the experiment continues to be as successful as interim results indicate, it is to be extended to the entire state in mid-1982.

When a debtor refuses or is unable to pay, and the usual court proceedings fail to settle the debt, he eventually has to serve a prison sentence.

The sentence is imposed as a number of days at a rate of so many marks a day.

This puts Hesse (and other states) on the spot. In 1980 there were 1,750 prison sentences imposed for debt offences. Yet prisons are overflowing.

Besides, short-term sentences expose prisoners to criminal influence and cost the taxpayer an estimated DM70 a day.

Sentences in Hanau and Kassel continue to be imposed in terms of so much money or, alternatively, so many days in goal. But convicts are now sent a letter saying they can do social work instead.

A list of social service centres where this work can be carried out is included. The condemned person has a fortnight in which to decide whether to take up the offer.

If he does, there is an application form attached for him to fill in and send to the authorities.

In the Hanau and Kassel areas there are 100 social services with 300 jobs between which debt offenders can choose.

They can work off their debt in kindergartens, old folk's homes, hospitals, sports clubs, museums, animals' homes and forestry departments.

They work in kitchens or as cleaners. They clean up the forest or keep parks neat and tidy. Even with unemployment on the increase there has been no difficulty yet in finding jobs for them.

They work free of charge. No social security, unemployment or health insurance contributions are made on their behalf. They can work either during the week or at weekends.

They work off the exact number of days to which they have been sentenced, six hours' work being counted as a day. Two court officials monitor the scheme to make sure that it works.

Their brief is not only to ensure that convicts serve their sentence but also to liaise with the social service facilities where they work.

In the first three months of the scheme 60 applications were made by convicted debtors in the two towns to work off their sentence by social service.

Thirty were doing so at the time of writing. Dr Zimmermann hopes in this way to be able to reduce by a third the number of sentences served for debt offences.

The debtors themselves are generally relieved at not having to spend time in prison, an absence the neighbours might notice.

They welcome the opportunity of inconspiciously working somewhere instead, and at a time and place of their own choosing. This enables them to keep up their normal jobs.

As Dr Zimmermann puts it: "Their social environment remains intact."

Albert Bechtold

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 17 December 1981)

The dangers of depression

Old people often get depressed. This is why they sometimes try and kill themselves.

Suicide motives among old people are the subject of a survey by Götz Kockott of the Max Planck Psychiatry Institute, Munich.

Widespread interest is shown in the motives of young people; few seem to care why the old may feel like committing suicide, he says.

Yet when they show signs of contemplating suicide, the signs must be taken very seriously indeed.

He deals with 4,190 patients whose case histories included suicide bids. They are considered in three age groups: under 40, between 40 and 64, and over 64. Men account for only about one case in three. Among the younger age groups men are clearly under-represented in relation to their proportion of the population.

Only among the over-64s does their number correspond to their percentage of the population in their age group.

Suicides seem more likely to be single or divorced than married in all three age groups. In the two younger groups the proportion of widows and widowers was roughly in keeping with the national average.

Dr Kockott attributes the infrequency of suicide among married people to the sharing of tasks and the feeling of togetherness marriage brings.

Writing in the medical journal *Fortschritte der Medizin*, he notes that both over-64s and under-64s gave disputes with husband or wife as the main single reason why they had attempted suicide.

Then came disputes with other members of the family, health worries (especially among the elderly), loneliness and lack of social contacts.

Fear of changes in personal circumstances rates fifth in order of importance; it is typical of the oldest of the three age groups.

It is usually a matter of having to leave the family home and move to an insititution.

Dr Kockott concludes that suicide prevention among the old must concentrate mainly on depression, which is common.

Intensive psychiatric care must also be accompanied by clear-cut social therapy to ensure that old folk do not feel there is nothing left for them to experience and that they are superfluous.

Rolf Degen

(Rheinische Post, 12 December 1981)